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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. The Complaint in this case challenged a "statewide system" 
of public defense services that does not exist. Plaintiffs alleged that they were denied public de-
fense services in four different counties at various stages of their criminal prosecutions. They 
sued (1) the State ofldaho, (2) the Governor in his official capacity, and (3) the seven Public De-
fense Commission members in their official capacities for prospective relief, including: (a) de-
claring Idaho's "statewide system" of public defense services unconstitutionally deficient, and 
(b) enjoining Defendants to propose, develop and implement, with District Court monitoring and 
approval, changes to the "statewide system." Defendants moved to dismiss. The District Court 
granted the Motion and entered Judgment for Defendants. Plaintiffs appealed. 
B. Statement of the Facts. The Complaint was dismissed under Rule 12(b )( 6). R., 
p. 475. Thus, the facts before the Court are those alleged in the Complaint. ABC Agra, LLC v. 
Critical Access Grp., Inc., 156 Idaho 781, 782, 331 P.3d 523, 524 (2014). According to the 
Complaint, each Plaintiff appeared in court on criminal charges for which he or she could be 
imprisoned. Complaint, ml 4-7; R., pp. 8-12. The Complaint's allegations include: 
Plaintiff Tracy Tucker was arrested in Bonner County, had bail set at $40,000 without 
representation by counsel, could not afford to post bond, was held in jail awaiting trial, was rep-
resented at arraignment by a "substitute" attorney who was unfamiliar with his case and who did 
not advocate in his favor, was able to contact his public defender only three times for 20 minutes 
before a scheduled trial, eventually pleaded guilty, and awaited sentencing. Complaint, ml 4, 63-
68, 110, 117-118, 126, 129, 156; R., pp. 8-9, 27-29, 39, 41-42, 45, 52. 1 
The Appellants' Brief says at p. 16 that "formal judgment was entered against Mr. Tucker and he 
was sentenced to a suspended prison term of two years fixed, plus two additional years indeterminate." 
None of this is in the appellate record. See also App.Br., pp. 31-32, further discussing Mr. Tucker's case, 
which also is not in the appellate record, either. 
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Plaintiff Jason Sharp was arrested in Shoshone County, had bail set at $50,000 without 
representation by counsel, could not afford to post bond, had bail reduced to $5,000, still could 
not afford to post bond, was released before trial by the efforts of his employer without the as-
sistance of the public defender, was unable to obtain discovery materials from his public defend-
er, was unable to persuade his public defender to file motions on his behalf, met with his public 
defender for only 90 minutes over 13 months, and was scheduled to go to trial. Complaint, fl 5, 
68-74, Ill, ll5, 126, 130, 157; R., pp. 9-10, 29-30, 39-40, 45-46, 52-53. 
Plaintiff Naomi Morley was arrested in Ada County, had counsel when bail was set at 
$15,000 (but had not been able to speak with her public defender, who later decided he had a 
conflict of interest and could not represent her), could not afford to post bond, remained in jail 
for three weeks until her bail was reduced, was told by conflict counsel that she would have to 
pay for expert drug testing, obtained on her own and without counsel's help an affidavit from 
another person that drugs found in the car were not Ms. Morley's, was unable to communicate 
with conflict counsel about her the police investigation or about her car, and feared that conflict 
counsel would not be able to adequately prepare for trial because of his workload. Complaint, 
fl 6, 75-79, 112, ll7, 127,130,133,158; R., p. 10-ll, 30-31, 39, 41, 45-46, 53. 
Plaintiff Jeremy Payne was arrested in Payette County, had bail set at $30,000 without 
representation by counsel, could not afford to post bond, remained in jail for over four months 
until the State failed to timely take his case to trial, met with his public defender outside of court 
only twice, had not been able to discuss discovery or strategy with his public defender, who in 
tum had not been able to meaningfully investigate his case, and was scheduled for trial after 
waiving his preliminary hearing. Complaint, fl 7, 80-84, 113, 126, 129, 136, 142, 159; R., pp. 
11-12, 32-33, 40, 45-47, 49, 54. 
Defendants are (I) the State of Idaho, (2) Governor C.L. "Butch" Otter in his official 
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capacity, and (3) the seven Idaho Public Defense Commission (PDC) members in their official 
capacities. 2 Complaint, ,nr 85-87; R., pp. 33-34. The Complaint did not allege specific actions 
that the Defendants took regarding any of the four Plaintiffs' criminal cases. Id. 
The Complaint repeatedly stated that public defense services in Idaho are provided under 
an unconstitutional system. Complaint; R.,passim at pp. 6-59. The constitutionality of the "sys-
tem", however, is a conclusion oflaw, not an allegation of fact that the Court must accept as true 
on a Motion to Dismiss. Owsley v. Idaho Indus. Comm 'n, 141 Idaho 129, 136, I 06 P.3d 455, 462 
(2005). Thus, the conclusory legal statements at App.Br., pp. 7-9, about the unconstitutionality 
ofldaho's "statewide" system of public defense are rhetorical at this stage of the case. 
Nevertheless, Defendants acknowledge the seriousness of the issues described in the 
Complaint. The rights of indigent criminal defendants to effective assistance of counsel provid-
ed at public expense are recognized under the State and Federal Constitutions and underlie the 
Idaho Public Defense Act. The rights to counsel are judicially enforceable in criminal defend-
ants' individual cases. The Complaint, however, proposes a judicially unmanageable and unen-
forceable solution to the problems that it identifies. That is why Defendants moved to dismiss in 
the District Court and why they urge this Court's affirmance of the District Court's judgment. 
C. Course of the Proceedings. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, R., 
pp. 154-155, was briefed and argued. The District Court granted the Motion to Dismiss and en-
tered Judgment for Defendants. R. pp. 468-501. Plaintiffs timely appealed. R., pp. 502-507. 
2 Defendants-Respondents Sara B. Thomas and William H. Wellman, who are members of the PDC, 
are separately represented and have filed their own Respondents' Brief because of"the inherent conflict 
of interest in having the Attorney General represent two active public defense attorneys and the problems 
associated with discovery." Brief of Respondents Sara B. Thomas and William H. Wellman (Thomas-
Well Respondents' Brief). This Brief is filed on behalf of the other Defendants-Respondents. 
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ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Are the Governor and the Public Defense Commission members causally connected to 
Plaintiffs' alleged injuries in fact (denial of public defense services) and/or do they have statutory 
or constitutional authority to redress Plaintiffs' alleged injuries in fact, i.e., are the second and 
third elements of standing present? 
May the State of Idaho be sued for declaratory and injunctive relief to change the statutes 
that make counties primarily responsible for provision of public defense services? 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Free Review 
The Court has free review over a dismissal under Rule l 2(b )( 6), Taylor v. McNichols, 149 
Idaho 826,832,243 P.3d 642,648 (2010), and free review over issues ofjusticiability, including 
standing, State v. Philip Morris, Inc., 158 Idaho 874, 879-80, 354 P.3d 187, 192-93 (2015). See 
also Standard of Review in Thomas-Wellman Respondents' Brief, pp. 5-6. 
Affirmance on Alternative Grounds 
When a judgment on appeal reaches the correct result, but employs reasoning that this 
Court does.not accept, this Court may affirm the judgment on alternative grounds. "[T]he Court 
will uphold the decision of a trial court if any alternative legal basis can be found to support it." 
Syringa Networks, LLC v. Idaho Dept of Administration, 159 Idaho 813,817,367 P.3d 208,222 
(2016) (internal punctuation omitted), quoting Daleiden v. Jefferson Cty. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 
251, 139 Idaho 466, 470-71, 80 P.3d 1067, 1071-72 (2003). 
ATTORNEYS' FEES ON APPEAL 
The Defendants do not seek attorneys' fees on appeal. They oppose the award of attor-
neys' fees to Plaintiffs for the following reasons. 
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Plaintiffs Will Not Be Entitled to Attorneys' Fees If the Judgment Is Affirmed 
The judgment should be affirmed, in which case Plaintiffs would not be entitled to attor-
neys' fees under Federal or State law. Viking Const., Inc. v. Hayden Lake Irr. Dist., 149 Idaho 
187,200,233 P.3d 118, 131 (2010), abrogated on other grounds, Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg'/ 
Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889,895,265 P.3d 502,508 (2011). 
Plaintiffs Would Not Be Entitled to Attorneys' Fees Under Federal Law if the Case Were 
Reversed and Remanded 
Plaintiffs' Federal law request for attorneys' fees is under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. App.Br., 
pp. 11-12. The State is not a "person" against whom attorneys' fees may be awarded under 
§ 1988 because it is not a person that can be sued and prevailed against under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
Will v. Michigan Dep 1 of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2308, 2312 (1989). 
Thus, attorneys' fees cannot be awarded against the State under§ 1988. 
42 U.S.C. § 1988 allows attorneys' fees to be awarded to "prevailing part[ies]." If this 
case were reversed and remanded under Federal law, Plaintiffs would not be prevailing parties 
against the Governor and/or the PDC members because there would be no ruling on the merits on 
which they had prevailed, i.e., Plaintiffs would not have materially altered the legal relationship 
between these parties. E.g., Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 758-759, 100 S.Ct. 1987, 
1990 (1980) (plaintiffs who reversed summary judgment on appeal had not prevailed on the 
merits any more than if they had defeated a summary judgment motion in the trial court; they 
were not entitled to attorneys' fees on appeal as a prevailing party). 
Plaintiffs Would Not Be Entitled to Attorneys' Fees Under State Law If the Case Were 
Reversed and Remanded 
The Court need not address whether fees may be awarded under State law in this appeal 
under the private attorney general doctrine for the same reason that relief is unavailable under 
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§ 1988: Reversing and remanding would not resolve the ultimate substantive issues. Idaho Sch. 
for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Idaho State Bd. of Educ., 128 Idaho 276, 285, 912 P.2d 644, 653 
(1996) (ISEEO II) (no fees awarded under the private attorney general doctrine when there was 
no resolution of substantive issues; reversing summary judgment and remanding did not resolve 
the merits and did not support a private attorney general fee award). 
Attorneys' fee should not be awarded under Idaho Code§ 12-117 or§ 12-121, both of 
which require prevailing party status on the merits, not merely reversing and remanding to deter-
mine the merits. Kaseburg v. State, Bd. of Land Comm 'rs, 154 Idaho 570, 579-80, 300 P.3d 
1058, 1067-68 (2013) (§ 12-117); Steel Farms, Inc. v. Croft & Reed, Inc., 154 Idaho 259,269, 
297 P.3d 222, 232 (2012)(§ 12-121). Further, for fees to be awarded under§ 12-117, the non-
prevailing party must have acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law, and under § 12-121, 
the non-prevailing party must have prosecuted or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without 
foundation. This case was not so defended. 
Moreover, under both§ 12-117 and§ 12-121, the Court does not ordinarily award attor-
neys' fees in a case of first impression, which this case is. Doe v. Doe, 2016 Opinion No. 56, pp. 
9-10, - Idaho-,-, -P.3d-, - (May 27, 2016). 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT'S DISMISSAL SHOULD BE AFFIRMED 
A. No Plaintiff Has Standing to Sue the Governor or the Public Defense Commission 
Under Federal or State Law 
The District Court's dismissal of the Governor and PDC members should be affirmed 
because no Plaintiff has standing under State or Federal law to sue them. Idaho law generally 
uses a three-part test for standing. To have standing a litigant must: 
Respondents' Brief - 6 
" ... allege [I] an injury in fact, [2] a fairly traceable causal connec-
tion between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct, and 
[3] a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested will 
prevent or redress the claimed injury." Knox v. State ex rel. Otter, 
148 Idaho 324, 336, 223 P.3d 266, 278 (2009). 
Rich v. State, 159 Idaho 553, 554-55, 364 P.3d 254, 255-56 (2015) (bracketed numbers added). 
This is also the standing test used under Federal law. E.g., Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 
573 U.S.-,-, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341 (2014). The Governor and PDC members (the Official 
Capacity Defendants) initially make the same arguments under both Federal and State law that 
Plaintiffs do not have standing to sue. Then they further address Plaintiffs' State law standing 
arguments under Coeur d'Alene Tribe v. Denney, 2015 Opinion No. 106, - Idaho-, - P.3d-
(November 20, 2015). 
The Official Capacity Defendants argue that the second and third elements of standing 
are missing. 3 Thus, they need not address whether each Plaintiff alleged an injury in fact and/or 
whether each had a ripe claim. 4 The Motion to Dismiss was not based on lack of injury in fact or 
on lack of ripeness; neither is this Brief. 5 Thus, Defendants do not address the injury-in-fact ar-
3 
Plaintiffs say "standing ... [was] never raised, briefed, or argued by either side." App.Br., p. 14. 
Defendants disagree. Admittedly, the word "standing" was not used in the Motion to Dismiss. R., p. 154. 
However, Defendants briefed standing, particularly its second and third elements, in their Memo-
randum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, R., pp. 164-166 ("there were no injuries in fact caused by or 
redressable by the defendants; these essential elements of standing were absent"); p. 171 ("One aspect of 
justiciability is redressability"); also Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, R, pp. 433, 
437,439,442,444,445 (redressability, standing, and causation mentioned). 
As for standing being argued, redressability was a recurring theme from Defendants' opening re-
marks, Tr., p. 64:3-17, to their closing comments: "[l]n closing, I'm like a broken record. Redressability, 
redressability, redressability. And these aren't the defendants who can provide redress, and until such de-
fendants are sued, this case should be dismissed." Tr., p. 111 :20-24. 
4 Defendants did not contest that the Complaint alleged injuries in fact in briefing and arguing their 
Motion to Dismiss. Neither did they contest ripeness. 
5 By not contesting that each Plaintiff alleged some injury in fact, Defendants do not concede that an 
injury in fact can be proven. Neither do Defendants concede that any Plaintiff is an appropriate class rep-
resentative or has established typicality or commonality of his or her claim. 
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gument at App.Br., pp. 16-23, or the ripeness argument at App.Br., pp. 30-33. Instead, Defend-
ants' standing arguments are based on (1) the absence ofa causal connection between Plaintiffs' 
alleged injuries in fact and the Official Capacity Defendants' actions or inactions, and (2) the 
Official Capacity Defendants' legal inability to redress the alleged injuries in fact. 
I. There Is No Causal Connection Between the Governor and the Public Defense 
Commission and Plaintiffe 'Alleged Injuries in Fact 
The Complaint does not allege facts connecting the Governor or PDC members to any in-
juries in fact. ,i 87, pp. 33-34. Thus, the Court should affirm the judgment because the Com-
plaint lacks the second element of standing to sue the Governor or PDC members: causal con-
nection between the alleged injuries in fact and these Defendants. 
Plaintiffs say, App.Br., p. 23, that Memorandum Decision & Order (MD&O) contradicted 
itself when it said that (1) "the Governor and the PDC members have a more than sufficiently 
close connection or nexus to the enforcement of public defense in Idaho," R., p. 485, but (2) "the 
connection of the claimed injury to the Governor and the PDC are too remote to be fairly trace-
able" to the Governor and the PDC, R., p. 490. Plaintiffs would resolve this inconsistency by 
arguing that the first conclusion of law is correct and the second one is not. The Official Capa-
city Defendants take the position that the first statement is incorrect. 
The MD&O cited no authority for its legal conclusions that the Governor and PDC have 
enough connection to indigent defense services to be sued. It said: 
Under the Ex parte Young doctrine, the Court finds that the Gover-
nor and the PDC members have a more than sufficiently close con-
nection or nexus to the enforcement of public defense in Idaho. [1] 
The Governor has a duty to ensure that the Constitution and laws 
are enforced in Idaho. [2] The Governor also has direct superviso-
ry authority over those responsible to establish standards for a con-
stitutionally sound public defense system. [3] The PDC was speci-
fically saddled with the responsibility of creating rules regarding 
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training and education of defense attorneys and making recommen-
dations to the legislature for improving public defense in Idaho. 
[ 4 J The fact that the legislature has delegated public defender ser-
vices to individual counties does not abdicate the Defendants' re-
sponsibility to indigent criminal defendants in the State of Idaho. 
MD&O, R., p. 485 (bracketed numbers added). There is no basis for the MD&O's four legal 
conclusions that there is a sufficiently close connection between the Governor and PDC and the 
public defense system in Idaho. The four conclusions oflaw are analyzed in turn. 
First, the Governor's charge under Idaho Constitution, Article IV, § 5, and Idaho Code 
§ 67-802 to "see[] that the laws are faithfully executed" has never been held to impose upon him 
the responsibility to see that every State and local official complies with every State and Federal 
law. The cases are legion in which a governor has been dismissed when sued under § 1983 be-
cause a generalized duty to enforce State law is insufficient causal connection to sue a governor. 
E.g., Association des Eleveurs de Canards et d'Oies du Quebec v. Harris, 729 F.3d 937, 943 (9th 
Cir. 2013), cert. denied- U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 398 (2014) (California governor dismissed because 
he had no direct connection with enforcement of anti:fois gras statute); Ariz. Contractors Ass 'n 
v. Napolitano, 526 F.Supp.2d 968, 983 (D. Ariz. 2007), ajf'd on other grounds, 558 F.3d 856 (9th 
Cir. 2008), ajf'd, 563 U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 1968 (2011) (Arizona governor dismissed when en-
forcement power was in county attorneys, not in the governor); Animal Legal Def Fund v. Otter, 
44 F.Supp.3d 1009, 1016-17 (D.Idaho 2014) ("plaintiff ... is not free to randomly select a state 
official to sue in order to challenge an allegedly unconstitutional statute"; Governor dismissed · 
for lack of connection to enforcement of a criminal statute). A generalized duty to faithfully 
execute the law does not create a sufficient connection to sue the Governor. 
Second, the MD&O did not identify those over whom the Governor "has direct supervi-
sory authority ... to establish standards for a constitutionally sound public defense system." 
Who are they? If they are Magistrates and District Judges, the Governor does not supervise 
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them; the Supreme Court does. Idaho Constitution, Article V, § 2 and § 9. 6 If they are county 
officials, county offices are created by Idaho Constitution, Article XVIII, § 5, and no statute or 
constitutional provision subjects them to the Governor's supervision. If they are the Public De-
fense Commission, no statute or constitutional provision gives the Governor supervisory author-
ity over the PDC. The last point is elaborated in the next paragraph. 
The PDC is an Executive Agency in the Department of Self-Governing Agencies, and its 
members are appointed by all three Branches of State Government. Idaho Code § 19-849(1 ). It 
should be self-evident that the PDC is self-governing and not subject to Gubernatorial supervi-
sion, especially when two PDC members are Idaho Legislators and one is appointed by the Chief 
Justice. It would raise separation-of-powers issues if the Governor supervised representatives of 
the Legislative and Judicial Branches and told them what to do. Further, one PDC member rep-
resents defense attorneys and another represents the State Appellate Public Defender. It would 
intrude upon their positions as defense attorneys if the Governor supervised them and told them 
what to do. Cf Thomas-Wellman Respondents' Brief, p. 4., regarding conflict of interest. But 
telling subordinates what to do is what supervision entails: "supervision ... esp : a critical 
watching and directing (as of activities or a course of action)." Merriam-Websters Collegiate 
Dictionary, p. 1255 (11 ed. 2007). This Court should hold that the PDC as an agency is not sub-
ject to supervision by officers of any Branch of State Government. 
Third, the PDC's responsibilities when judgment was entered were to promulgate rules 
for criminal defense attorney training and data reporting and to make recommendations to the 
6 Plaintiffs say that "this Court has an enhanced responsibility to take remedial action in this case" 
and that "this Court could take remedial action on its own." Given this Court's constitutional supervisory 
power over the lower courts, Idaho Constitution, Article V, § 2, there are no constitutional impediments 
to this Court issuing remedial directions to District Judges and Magistrates regarding public defense. See, 
e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 153 So.2d 299 (Fla. 1963). 
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Legislature on public defense issues. That was all. Idaho Code§ 19-850(1) (2015 Supp.). Like 
any statutory agency, the PDC has only the authority given to it by statute. "An administrative 
agency is a creature of statute, limited to the power and authority granted it by the Legislature 
and may not exercise its sub-legislative powers to modify, alter, or enlarge the legislative act 
which it administers." Welch v. Del Monte Corp., 128 Idaho 513,514,915 P.2d 1371, 1372 
(1996), cited in In re Wright, 148 Idaho 542, 548, 224 P.3d 1131, 113 7 (20 I 0). 7 There was no 
causal connection between the PDC's duties and the alleged injuries recapped at pp. 1-2, supra. 
Fourth, the MD&O said that delegation of responsibility for public defense services to 
the counties "does not abdicate the Defendants' responsibility to indigent criminal defendants." 
That begs the question: What are Defendants' responsibilities to indigent criminal defendants? 
The Governor has no specific responsibilities. The PDC members' responsibilities are those 
given to them by statute - nothing more. In short, there was no basis for the MD&O's legal 
conclusion that "the Governor and the PDC members have a more than sufficiently close connec-
tion ... to the enforcement of public defense in Idaho." R., p. 485. 
Fifth, Plaintiffs seem to argue that if they "allege longstanding, statewide deficiencies in 
the Idaho system, which result in actual and constructive denial of counsel across the state," 
App.Br., p. 25, then some State officer(s)- the Governor and/or PDC members -must be 
subject to suit. That argument in effect requires the Court to create a "default" defendant if no 
defendant responsible for the alleged injuries in fact and with authority to redress them can be 
found. No principle of standing law requires creation of a "default" defendant. Animal Legal 
Def Fund, supra. The District Court's dismissal of the Governor and the PDC members should 
7 The 2016 Legislature amended Idaho Code§ 19-850 to give the PDC increased rulemaking author-
ity and to give it enforcement authority for the first time. This Brief addresses these statutory changes in 
Part I.A.4 of this Argument, pp. 19-22, infra. 
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be affirmed because neither has any causal connection to Plaintiffs' injuries in fact. 
2. Idaho Law Does Not Give the Governor or the Public Defense Commission 
Authority to Redress Plaintiffs' Alleged Injuries in Fact 
a. The Governor Is Not Responsible for Preventing and Remedying Violation 
of Constitutional Rights Everywhere in Idaho 
The Governor is a constitutional Executive Officer. Idaho Constitution, Article IV, § I. 
"The supreme executive power is vested in the governor, who shall see that the laws are faithful-
ly executed." Article IV, § 5. The supreme executive power and the duty to faithfully execute 
the laws are general; no court has held that they obligate a Governor to supervise and be respon-
sible for every State and local official's exercise of authority that may implicate a constitutional 
or statutory right. In particular, the Governor has no statutory or constitutional authority over 
County Commissioners or public defenders that allows him to redress Plaintiffs' alleged injuries. 
The following example shows the overreach of the argument that the Governor is responsible in 
his official capacity for the "State's" denial of Sixth Amendment public defense services. 
Section I of the Fourteenth Amendment expressly prohibits the "State" from denying 
three sets of constitutional rights: 
No State shall [a] make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall 
any State [b] deprive any person oflife, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law; nor [ c] deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the law. 
(Bracketed letters added.) Taking Plaintiffs' argument that the Governor is responsible for pre-
venting the State's deprivation of the right to counsel to its logical end, then the Governor would 
also to be responsible under the Fourteenth Amendment, § I, for preventing every State and local 
officer and agency from: 
(a) making or enforcing any Idaho law or local ordinance abridging privileges or immun-
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ities of citizens of the United States; 
(b) depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; and 
( c) denying equal protection of the law to any person in Idaho. 
No statutory or constitutional provision has ever been held to make a governor responsible for 
every violation of Federal law in his or her State, but that would be the logical outcome of Plain-
tiffs' argument that the Governor is obligated under the Sixth Amendment and/or Article I,§ 13, 
to guarantee that the State must provide effective counsel to indigent defendants. The Court 
should reject Plaintiffs' unprecedented argument that the Governor can be sued to "require[e] the 
State to actually implement effective reform," App.Br., p. 26, and affirm his dismissal under the 
third element of standing because he has no ability to redress Plaintiffs' grievances any more 
than he could redress every Fourteenth Amendment violation in the example above. 
Plaintiffs cite Los Angeles County Bar Ass 'n v. Eu, 979 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1992), to coun-
ter such redressability arguments. App.Br., p. 24. In this judicial tour de force, the County Bar 
challenged a statute setting the number of judges in Los Angeles County under a theory that "a 
shortage of state court judges causes inordinate delays in civil litigation, depriving litigants of 
access to the courts." Id. at 699. The Ninth Circuit did not require dismissal of the Governor, 
who could not create judgeships, but who would appoint judges to new positions, or the Secre-
tary of State, who could not create judgeships, but who would certify new positions in future 
elections; neither could increase the number of judges in the county. But, the Court said it was 
likely that the California Legislature, which was not a party, would abide by a decision to in-
crease judgeships if one were made. Id. at 70 I. To say that this stretches redressability for 
standing is an understatement. But, Eu insulated its overreach by denying relief on the merits, 
thus precluding further review by the Governor or Secretary of State because there was no judg-
ment against them. Eu cannot be squared with recent cases like Canards or Napolitano, supra. 
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b. The Governor Cannot Expand His or Other Officers' Authority by 
Executive Order or by Exercising His Supervisory Powers 
Plaintiffs argue that the Governor "has the power to redress the alleged injuries, both by 
issuing executive orders that can impact indigent defense" and by using his supervisory powers. 
App.Br., p. 27. It was shown earlier that the Governor has no direct supervisory powers over 
judges, county officials, or the PDC. See pp. 9 -10, supra. That discussion is not repeated. This 
Brief now explains why the Governor's authority to issue executive orders does not allow him to 
redress Plaintiffs' injuries in fact by giving agencies extra-statutory authority. 
The Governor's authority to issue executive orders is granted "within the limits imposed 
by the constitution and laws of this state." Idaho Code § 67-802. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs cite 
three Executive Orders to support their position that the Governor may redress their injuries by 
Executive Order, even without statutory authority to do so. 
The first Executive Order is No. 2015-11, Idaho Administrative Bulletin (IAB), 8 Vol. 15-
12, pp. 27-28. Plaintiffs say EO No. 2015-11 tasked the Juvenile Justice Commission (JJC) with 
ensuring compliance with the Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Act of 2002, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5601 et 
seq., and authorized the JJC to take remedial action for violations. App. Br., p. 27. They are 
correct; Federal law requires just that. 
EO 2015-11, ,r 2.d, directs the JJC to "Ensure compliance with the core protections of the 
JJDPA by jurisdictions with public authority in Idaho through education, technical assistance, 
monitoring and remedial actions for violations." That is what 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(3) mandates: 
There must be an advisory group like the JJC to assure compliance with the JJDPA's require-
ments to separate adult and juvenile detainees and not to confine status offenders,§ 5633(a)(ll)-
(13), and to equitably treat those in the juvenile justice system on the basis of gender, race, fami-
8 Executive Orders are published in the Idaho Administrative Bulletin, Idaho Code§ 67-5203(4)(a), 
which is on-line at http://adminrules.idaho.gov/bulletin/index.html. 
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ly income, and disability,§ 5633(a)(l5), including monitoring facilities to see that§ 5633(a)(1l)-
(I3)'s requirements are met, § 5633(a)(l4). 9 When the State accepts Federal funds it is common 
that it must designate a body to monitor that those funds are spent in accordance with Federal 
law. EO 2015-11 implements these statutory and regulatory requirements of the JJDPA, but it 
does not create authority not based on Federal law. 
The second Executive Order is No. 2016-01, lAB Vol. 16-6, pp. 15-17, which Plaintiffs 
say "empowered an executive branch council to play an expanded role beyond its statutory au-
thority and tasked it with the duty of aligning policy and funding systems." App.Br., p. 27 (inter-
nal punctuation omitted). Plaintiffs do not say how EO No. 2016-01 expands the Early Child-
hood Coordinating Council's role "beyond its statutory authority." Quite the contrary, the first 
sentence ofldaho Code § 16-106 provides: "(I) The council shall have the following authority, 
duties and responsibilities, and such other functions as may be assigned by executive order." 
Emphasis added. Thus, when the Governor assigned tasks to the Council in EO No. 2016-01, he 
was doing what was authorized by statute, not expanding the Council's statutory authority. 
The third Executive Order is No. 2015-10, lAB Vol. 15-12, pp. 23-26, which continues 
the Idaho Criminal Justice Commission (CJC). Plaintiffs blithely say: "If other bodies and pro-
cedures are failing to bring Idaho's indigent defense system up to constitutional muster, the Gov-
ernor can expand the CJC's role to include enforcement powers, as he has with the Idaho Juve-
nile Justice Commission. See Executive Order No. 2015-11." App.Br., p. 28. However, as al-
ready shown, the Governor did not expand the JJC's powers to include enforcement; enforce-
ment was required by Federal law. When it comes to substantive law, an agency has only the 
9 See also 28 C.F.R. § 3 l .303(a): when the State receives JJDPA funds, it must have a body to certi-
fy various things, including de-institutionalization of juvenile status offenders, § 31.303( c ), separation of 
confined juveniles from adults, § 31.303( d), removal of juveniles from adult jails, § 31.303( e ), monitoring 
of juvenile facilities, § 3 l .303(f), and compliance with these requirements, § 3 l .303(g). 
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authority given to it by law. Welch, supra, 128 Idaho at 514,915 at (1996); Wright, supra, 148 at 
548,224 P.3d at 1137. Therefore, the Governor's Executive Orders do not show that he can or 
does create authority in an agency where there is none. 
Plaintiffs contend that the Governor "has broad executive authority that enables him to 
influence statewide policies and procedures, including those related to public defense." App.Br., 
p. 27 (emphasis added). Defendants agree. The Governorship is a bully pulpit; the Governor's 
ability to influence policies and procedures played no small part in amending the public defense 
statutes in 2016. 2016 Idaho Senate Journal, pp. 7- 8 (Governor addressed public defense in the 
State of the State speech). But the ability to influence legislation is not the authority to enact 
legislation. The District Court cannot realistically order the Governor "to influence statewide 
policies and procedures" and then hold him accountable for lack of influence. The political abil-
ity to influence is not the legal ability to redress an injury in fact. The Governor appreciates 
Plaintiffs' crediting him with the appropriation of funds for trial-level public defense, App.Br., 
p. 47, but in the end Plaintiffs are complimenting his powers of persuasion, not his legal "author-
ity to take concrete steps to reform the system," id., through legislation. 
Plaintiffs cite Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452, 122 S.Ct. 2191 (2002), and say that even if 
Defendants cannot redress Plaintiffs' injuries, "it is enough that the practical consequence of a 
court decision would amount to a significant increase in the likelihood that the plaintiff would 
obtain relief that directly redressed the injury suffered." App.Br., p. 28 (internal punctuation 
omitted). This case is not like Evans. Evans stated that if the Secretary of Commerce were or-
dered to resubmit a census report showing one member of the House of Representatives should 
be reassigned from North Carolina to Utah (which the Court could order), then the President 
likely would perform his statutory duty to transmit that report to Congress (which the Court 
could not order), and the Clerk of the House of Representatives likely would perform his statu-
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tory duty to so notify the Governors of North Carolina and Utah (which the Court could not 
order): "[W]e may assume it is substantially likely that the President and other executive and 
congressional officials would abide by an authoritative interpretation of the census statute and 
constitutional provision even though they would not be directly bound by such a determination." 
536 U.S. at 460, 122 S.Ct. at 2197, quoting Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788,803, 112 
S.Ct. 2767, 2777 (1992). Thus, Utah had standing to sue the Secretary of Commerce because it 
was "substantially likely" that the other officers involved would perform their ministerial tasks 
regarding census reports if the Secretary were ordered to resubmit a census report. 536 U.S. at 
460-64, 122 S.Ct. at 2197-99. 
If only this case were that simple. If a letter from the Governor or the PDC would have 
cured the problems identified in the Complaint, the standing issue would be great simplified, if 
not wholly eliminated. But, as explained in Part LC. of this Argument on Separation of Powers, 
iefra at p. 23-32, legislation is necessary to provide the redress requested in the Complaint, and 
redress cannot be achieved by two ministerial acts like those in Evans: forwarding revised cen-
sus reports to Congress and to the affected States. 
Plaintiffs casually dismiss lack of redressability by positing without further explanation: 
"Plaintiffs' injuries are directly redressable by both the Governor and the PDC." App.Br., p. 28. 
Again, they beg the question: Under what authority? For example, can the Governor or the PDC 
tell the counties to spend more money than already appropriated for public defense? Can they 
actively manage the counties' public defender contracts? This remedial list can go on, but only 
the Legislature can select the appropriate remedies. If Plaintiffs know how the Governor and the 
PDC can provide the redress they seek, they needed to explain how. They did not. The District 
Court's dismissal of the Governor and PDC should be affirmed for lack ofredressability. 
Respondents' Brief - 17 
3. Coeur d'Alene Tribe Did Not Relax the Causation and Redressability Elements of 
Standing 
Plaintiffs argue that Coeur d'Alene Tribe v. Denney, 2015 Opinion No. 106, - Idaho-, 
- P.3d- (2015), has relaxed standing requirements under State law, so their Complaint should 
be heard because it raises significant constitutional issues. App.Br., p. 29. Plaintiffs are correct 
that Coeur d'Alene Tribe discussed circumstances under which the Court may relax the first ele-
ment of standing ( distinct, palpable injury in fact personal to a plaintiff), but it did not discuss 
relaxation of the second and third elements (causation and redressability), nor did it relax them. 
This first element is not at issue in this appeal; the second and third are. 
After a statute authorizing betting on historical horse races was repealed by the Legisla-
ture, Coeur d'Alene Tribe decided whether the repealing bill (I) was not timely returned to the 
Senate with the Governor's objections and became law, or (2) was timely returned with the Gov-
ernor's objections and thus was vetoed. Coeur d'Alene Tribe said, "the Tribe has not demon-
strated a 'distinct and palpable' injury sufficient to confer standing" regarding repeal or veto, but 
"it is not necessary that a citizen show a special injury to himself or his property ... to compel 
public officers to perform non-discretionary ministerial duties" because "[t]he public has a signi-
ficant interest in the integrity ofldaho's democratic government." 2015 Opinion No. 106 at 5, 7. 
The significant interest was whether the repeal had been vetoed in the manner required by law. 
The first element of standing - requiring a personal, distinct and palpable injury - was relaxed 
because "there would be no one to enforce the important constitutional provisions involved ... or 
to ensure that the integrity of the law-making process" if the Tribe did not have standing. Id. at 
7. Coeur d'Alene Tribe did not, however, hold that causation and redressability were not neces-
sary elements of standing. Although not they were discussed, both elements were present. 
Coeur d'Alene Tribe analyzed the Secretary of State's statutory, ministerial duties. Idaho 
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Code § 67-505 gave him a ministerial duty to certify as law a bill that became law when the 
Governor did not return it to the originating house within five days. 2015 Opinion No. 106 at 8. 
When the Secretary of State did not certify the repeal as law, there was causation because the 
repeal was not on the books. Moreover, he could redress the injury by certifying the repeal as 
law. Id. at 17-21. Thus, the elements of standing missing here-causation and redressabilty-
were present in Coeur d'Alene Tribe. Its standing analysis for injury in fact does not help Plain-
tiffs because they still lack two of the three elements of standing. 
Plaintiffs exaggerate when they say that if they "cannot bring this lawsuit, there will be 
no one to enforce this essential right against continued inaction and delay .... " App.Br., p. 29. 
Plaintiffs do not lack standing because there is no one else who could sue; they allege just the 
opposite, that "thousands of indigent defendants" are in similar circumstances, all of whom 
presumably could sue. Complaint, ,r 8; R., p. 12. Plaintiffs lack standing because they sued 
Defendants who did not cause and cannot redress their injuries by a ministerial action. 
4. The Public Defense Commissions New Duties Do Not Put It In Charge of Reme-
dying Constitutional Violations, and It Cannot Be Enjoined to Do So 
When this case was before the District Court, the Public Defense Commission had a duty 
(I) to promulgate rules for required training and continuing education for public defenders and 
rules for uniform data reporting for public defense and (2) to make recommendations to the Leg-
islature. Idaho Code§ 19-850 (2015 Supp.). That was all. Provision of public defense services 
was and still is the counties' responsibility. Idaho Code§ 19-859. 10 
IO Idaho Code § 19-859 imposes upon County Commissioners the obligation to provide for indigent 
criminal defense and prohibits future "fixed-fee" contracts: 
§ 19-859. Public defender authorized - Joint county public defenders. - The 
board of county commissioners of each county shall provide for the representation of indi-
gent persons and other individuals who are entitled to be represented by an attorney at public 
expense. The board of county commissioners of each county shall provide this representa-
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In 2016 the Legislature amended§ 19-850 to give the PDC new rulemaking authority ov-
er public defense services. 2016 Idaho Session Law, Chapter 195, Section 1. 11 Sections 2, 4 and 
5 amended Idaho Code§ 19-851 and § 19-862 12 and added a new§ I 9-862A to provide that the 
PDC may provide grants to assist with counties' public defense, may require counties to comply 
with the indigent defense standards that the PDC adopts, and may remedy a county's willful and 
material failure to comply with indigent defense standards at county expense. See especially 
newly enacted Idaho Code§ 19-862A(l 1)-(12). Neither Chapter 195 nor any other 2016 Session 
Law amended § 19-859, which keeps primary responsibility for public defense with the counties. 
This is a case for injunctive relief. R., p. 59. Under both Federal and State Jaw, claims 
for injunctive or other prospective relief are adjudicated under the Jaw in effect when the court 
decides the case, be the case before the trial court or an appellate court, because such relief oper-
ates infaturo. Landrafv. US! Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 273-274, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 1501 
(1994); 511 U.S. at 293, 114 S.Ct. at 1525-1526 (Scalia, concurring in the judgment); Adams 
tion by one (I) of the following: 
(I) Establishing and maintaining an office of public defender; 
(2) Joining with the board of county commissioners of one (1) or more other counties 
within the same judicial district to establish and maintain a joint office of public defender 
pursuant to an agreement authorized under section 67-2328, Idaho Code; 
(3) Contracting with an existing office of public defender; or 
(4) Contracting with a defending attorney, provided that the terms of the contract shall 
not include any pricing structure that charges or pays a single fixed fee for the services and 
expenses of the attorney. The contract provisions of this subsection shall apply to all con-
tracts entered into or renewed on or after the effective date of this act. 
II 2016 House Bill 504, 2016 Idaho Session Law, Chapter 195, is an appendix to this Brief. It is not 
surprising that "even with additional authority recently granted by statute," there was no "actual change 
on the ground." App.Br., p. 7. The Act became effective July I, 2016, over two months after Appellants' 
Brief was filed. Idaho Code§ 67-510. Of course there was no change when Appellants' Brief was filed 
because this amendment had not yet taken effect. 
12 Idaho Code § 19-862 was also amended by 2016 Senate Bill 1362, 2016 Idaho Session Law, Chap-
ter 214. See http://www.legislature.idaho.gov/sessioninfo/2016/codeindex.htm, which lists all Idaho 
Code sections affected by 2016 legislation. 
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County Abstract Co. v. Fisk, 117 Idaho 513, 515, 788 P.2d 1336, 1335 (Ct. App. 1990) (entitle-
ment to writ of mandamus decided under most recent amendment to law). 
The 2016 amendments to§ 19-850 give the PDC many additional duties effective July I, 
2016. Here, Plaintiffs can only speculate that the PDC will act inconsistently with its new au-
thority. If Plaintiffs had sued under the Administrative Procedure Act to require the PDC to ad-
opt rules or to take other actions required by§ 19-850, either before or after the 2016 amend-
ments, they might have a case for judicial review under the APA. See Idaho Code§ 67-5201(3) 
("agency action" includes "failure to issue a rule" and "failure to perform, any duty imposed by 
law"); § 67-5270 (persons aggrieved by final agency actions may petition for judicial review). 
Plaintiffs are not asking for judicial review under the APA, however. They are suing un-
der § 1983 to enforce Sixth Amendment rights and under Article I, § 13 to enforce State constitu-
tional rights. Claims for Relief and Prayers for Relief; R., pp. 56-58. The relief sought is consti-
tutionally adequate public defense services. How the PDC will implement its new authority un-
der the 2016 amendments with regard to constitutionally required public defense services is not 
yet ripe for review on this record and should not be considered on appeal. 
These APA ripeness concerns become even more evident when the PDC 's new authority 
under amended§ 19-850 is considered. The new authority, once brought to bear, will promote 
improved public defense services, but the PDC is still not statutorily obligated to provide con-
stitutionally adequate public defense services itself. Initial responsibility stays with the counties. 
Idaho Code§ 19-859. The PDC can provide public defense services only ifit finds under§ 19-
862A(l l)(b) that a county "has willfully and materially failed to comply with [the PDC's] indi-
gent defense standards"; until that happens, the counties are responsible for providing constitu-
tional public defense services. Section l 9-862A( 11 )(b) 's direction for the PDC to provide public 
defense services only when a county has willfully and materially refused to do so shows that the 
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PDC has no general statewide mandate to ensure the constitutional adequacy of public defense 
services; if it did, this section would not be necessary. 
Suing the PDC to take responsibility for the counties' provision of public defense servic-
es is like suing the farmer who grows the wheat to force the baker who uses the wheat to make 
better bread. The farmer would be only indirectly responsible for the quality of the baker's bread 
(no direct causation) and not capable of ma.king the baker improve his bread (no ability to redress 
injury). Thus, the 2016 amendments to§ 19-850 do not confer standing upon Plaintiffs to sue 
the PDC because, like the farmer and the baker, the amendments allow the PDC to improve in-
puts to counties' public defense services, but do not cure the absence of injury in fact caused by 
the PDC (which does not provide public defense services) and the PDC's inability to redress the 
alleged injuries in fact. Rather than "resolv[ing] all doubt that the PDC and Governor have more 
than enough authority to remedy the Plaintiffs' grievances," App.Br., p. 47, amended§ 19-850's 
precise circumscription of the PDC's authority to provide public defender services under ex-
treme, limited circumstances shows that the PDC has only the authority given to it, which does 
not include a general charge to remedy all denials of indigent defendants' right to counsel. Noth-
ing in this record shows that the PDC will not carry out its new responsibilities. 
B. The State Cannot Be Sued for Injunctive Relief under Federal or State Law 
The District Court's denial of injunctive relief against the State should be affirmed. 
Plaintiffs conceded that Idaho is not a "person" who can be sued under § 1983. R., p. 406, n.2; 
p. 481. E.g., Will v. Michigan, supra, 491 U.S. at 69, 109 S.Ct. at 2311 (a State is not a person 
that can be sued for damages under§ 1983); Lucchese v. Colorado, 807 P.2d 1185, 1194 (Colo. 
App. 1990) (a State is not a person who can be sued for injunctive relief under§ 1983). 
That leaves the question of whether Idaho may be sued for injunctive relief under State 
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law. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 3(b) answers that question in the negative: 
Rule 3(b ). Designation of party 
. . . Provided, all civil actions by or against a governmental 
unit or agency, ... shall designate such party in its governmental ... 
name only, and individuals constituting the governing boards of 
governmental units ... shall not be designated as parties in any 
capacity unless the action is brought against them individually or 
for relief under Rules 65 or 74. 
Emphasis added. 
Weyyakin Ranch Property Owners' Assoc., Inc. v. City of Ketchum, 127 Idaho 1, 896 P.2d 
327 (1995), holds that the general rule that suit is brought against a government entity in the 
name of that governmental entity and not against its officers does not apply when the suit is for 
an injunction. To obtain an injunction, Rule 3(b) requires the Complaint to name specific offi-
cers to be enjoined because the government entity itself cannot be enjoined. 
This action for injunctive relief pursuant to I.R.C.P. 65 ... sought 
to enjoin the "City of Ketchum" from taking any further action to 
complete the proposed annexation. The designation of the "City 
of Ketchum," rather than the elected officials individually, vio-
lates LR. C.P. 3(b). Because the temporary restraining orders failed 
to name the elected officials individually, the trial court never ob-
tained jurisdiction over them, and therefore did not have the au-
thority to find them in contempt. 
127 Idaho at 2-3, 896 P.2d at 328-329 (emphasis added). Accordingly, Idaho cannot be sued for 
injunctive relief under State law. The Court should affirm dismissal of all claims for injunctive 
relief against the State. 
C. Separation of Powers Precludes the District Court from Providing the Remedies 
Sought in the Complaint 
This Court should affirm the District Court's dismissal of the Complaint on separation-of-
powers grounds. The MD&O explained how Plaintiffs did not challenge the constitutionality of 
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existing statutes, but asked the District Court to reshape Idaho law to transfer responsibility for 
indigent public defense from the counties to the State. Its spot-on analysis is quoted at length: 
. . . [T)he Idaho legislature has delegated the duty to provide indi-
gent criminal defense to the counties. See LC § 19-859. Plaintiffs 
ask the Court to override this system and reshape the system of in-
digent criminal defense in Idaho. . .. [I]t would invade the pro-
vince of the legislature to do so. 
Plaintiffs do not argue that ... delegating ... public defense [to the 
counties] is unconstitutional. They ... argue that the county com-
missioners ... fail[] to protect their constitutional rights to counsel 
and a fair trial. Instead of[suing] ... counties ... , they [sued] the 
State, the Governor, and the PDC. Plaintiffs ... do not argue that 
the statute establishing the PDC is unconstitutional. They argue ... 
that the PDC is ... ineffective and inadequate ... to redress ... in-
adequate or ineffective assistance of public defense counsel. In-
stead of seeking to have an act declared unconstitutional, they 
ask ... to declare inaction to be unconstitutional [and) to declare 
the whole system ... unconstitutional and ... establish standards or 
guidelines ... that the Governor, the PDC, the legislature, and all 
counties (whom they have not sued ... ), must follow. Plaintiffs 
ask this Court to mandate that the Governor and the PDC (and 
the legislature and counties) must enact ... legislation, ordinan-
ces, or rules to meet those standards, and to provide adequate 
funding therefore. This Court does not have the power or juri-
sdiction to do so under the established principles of separation of 
powers ... in the federal and state constitutions. 
. . . [I]t is not the role of courts, but that of the political branches, to 
shape the ... government ... to comply with ... the Constitution. 
Accordingly, the Court finds the case violates the separation of 
powers doctrine. 
MD&O; R., pp. 496-98 (emphasis added). 
Statute requires counties to provide public defense. Idaho Code§ 19-859. Plaintiffs' 
Prayers for Relief ask the District Court to enmesh itself in the Legislative function by enjoining 
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the State to modify, subject to the Court's approval and monitoring, what are innocuously called 
"specific modifications to the structure and operation of the State's indigent defense system." 
The "specific modifications" prayed for would be statutes changing the public defense system: 
C) Declare that the constitutional rights ofldaho's indigent crimi-
nal defendants are being violated by the State on an ongoing basis, 
and provide a deadline for the State to move this Court for appro-
val of specific modifications to the structure and operation of the 
State~ indigent-defense system; 
E) Enter an injunction requiring the State to propose, for this 
Court's approval and monitoring, a plan to develop and implement 
a statewide system of public defense that is consistent with the 
U.S. Constitution and the Constitution and laws of the State of 
Idaho; 
Complaint, Prayers for Relief, R., p. 58 (emphasis added). 
The District Court concluded that the Prayers for Relief would require statutory changes 
to implement. R., p. 497. Idaho Constitution, Article II, § 1, provides for separation of powers, 
and Article III, § I, places the Legislative Power in the Legislature and the people, not in the 
Governor, the PDC, or the District Court. Given this separation of powers, the District Court 
held that it cannot "mandate that the Governor and the PDC ( and the legislature and counties) ... 
enact ... legislation." R., p. 497. That legal conclusion is correct. "[M]andamus will not lie to 
compel the Legislature to enact any legislation .... [A] judicially compelled enactment oflegis-
lation ... is the very exercise of legislative power itself." County of San Diego v. State, 164 
Cal.App.4th 580, 594, 79 Cal.Rptr.3d 489, 501 (2008) (decided under California's similar sepa-
ration-of-powers article). "(C]reation of a new county is an exercise of legislative power ... ; the 
Legislature cannot be compelled to form a new county." Cedar County Committee v. Munro, 134 
Wash.2d 377,380,950 P.2d 446,447 (1998) (decided under Washington's similar separation-of-
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powers article). Plaintiffs are candid that a judicial order to pass legislation is exactly what they 
seek: "The court would ... enter any appropriate order to set the other branches into motion to 
correct deficiencies." App.Br., p. 44. Such a judicial order would violate separation of powers. 
1. Plaintiffs Cite No Authority that the District Court May Enjoin Defendants to 
Enact New Statutes 
How do Plaintiffs respond to the MD&O's separation-of-powers analysis that the District 
Court does not have authority to compel the enactment of legislation? In Part IV.B.3.a of their 
Argument, App.Br., pp. 34-39, they avoid the issue of whether the District Court has authority to 
order a change in the statutes, which is the only way that a "statewide system" of indigent public 
defense can be created. When Plaintiffs say that "alleged, with particularity, that ... ongoing 
constitutional violations are due to failures at the state level that the individual counties alone 
cannot remedy," App.Br., p. 34, and thus the State can be sued, they beg two questions: (1) Can 
a given county's failure to deliver public defense services be remedied at the county level?, and 
(2) Does the District Court have authority to order and monitor a Statewide (i.e., legislative) 
restructuring of public defense services until that restructuring meets with its approval? No case 
discussed in Part IV.B.3.a addresses whether the District Court may order the Legislature to pass 
additional statutes that meet with the District Court's approval, especially when the Complaint 
does not even pray for a declaration that the existing statutory scheme of county-provided public 
defense services is unconstitutional. 
2. Plaintiffs Cite No Authority That Exercising Discretion How to Tackle and Solve a 
Problem Is Subject to Mandamus or Injunction 
In Part IV.B.3.b of Appellants' Brief, pp. 39-42, Plaintiffs summarize that "[t]he main 
principle to be distilled from the precedent set forth [in Part IV.B.3.a] is that the separation of 
powers doctrine only limits judicial review of other branches' discretionary acts." App.Br., p. 39. 
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Plaintiffs' theme in Part IV.B.3.b is that complying with the Sixth Amendment and with Article I, 
§ 13, are not discretionary acts, but are mandatory and may be compelled by the District Court. 
Defendants agree that it is not discretionary whether to comply with the Sixth Amendment, Arti-
cle I, § 13, or any other constitutional provision; compliance with constitutional provisions is 
mandatory. But the decision how the State will structure the institutions ofldaho government to 
comply with the Sixth Amendment and with Article I, § 13, is discretionary because, unlike the 
situations in Coeur d'Alene Tribe or Evans, there is no ministerial act like filling out a form to 
certify a bill as law or forwarding a census report that will result in compliance. 
Defendants do not argue that it would violate separation of powers for an Idaho court to 
decide if a Plaintiff were denied rights to counsel secured by the Sixth Amendment and/or by 
Article I, § 13. Defendants do argue that it would violate separation of powers to grant the Com-
plaint's Prayers for Relief to restructure the State's public defense statutes because only the 
Legislature can provide that remedy. Gideon v. Wainwright, 153 So.2d 299 (Fla. 1963 ), cited 
App.Br., p. 40, the Florida Supreme Court's decision on remand from Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 
U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792 (1963), supports this position. Upon remand, the Florida Supreme Court 
acted in the only way that it could, by modifying the criminal rules applied by the lower Florida 
courts, not by ordering the Legislature to "fix the system." 153 So.2d at 300. 
The Idaho cases cited at Part IV.B.3.b, App.Br., pp. 39-42, of the Argument do not sup-
port Plaintiffs' implicit position that the District Court can require the revision of the public de-




These are the Idaho cases cited in Part IV .B.3 of Appellants' Brief, pp. 39-42: 
In re SRBA Case No. 39576, 128 Idaho 246,912 P.2d 614 (1995), upheld amended statutes gov-
erning the Snake River Basin Adjudication; it did not require the Legislature to modify them. 
Judge Burnett's concurrence in State v. Garza, 112 Idaho 778, 785-86, 735 P.2d 1089, I 096-97 
(Ct.App. 1987), reconciled possibly conflicting statutes and court rules for search warrants by 
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services under § 19-859 and ask for injunctive relief, they may do so without violating separation 
of powers. They have not. Instead, they sued Executive officers and asked for injunctive reme-
dies available only from the Legislature. Granting that relief would violate separation-of-powers 
principles by the District Court ordering executive officers to make legislative changes. 
3. The District Court's Concerns About Separation of Powers Were Not Misplaced 
In Part IV.8.3.c of their Argument, App.Br., pp. 42-45, Plaintiffs say that the District 
Court's separation-of-powers analysis "expressed misplaced concern" about "reshaping the sys-
tem of indigent criminal defense in Idaho." Not to worry: "[T]hejudiciary has a fundamental 
responsibility to override other branches' failure to act and to remediate unconstitutional state 
systems." App.Br., p. 42 (some internal punctuation omitted). In support of this position, they 
cite Coeur d'Alene Tribe, two ISSEO cases, and Hellar v. Cenarrusa, supra. 
None of these cases stands for the proposition that the District Court can require the 
Legislature to enact a new statutory structure for public defense services. Coeur d'Alene Tribe 
required the Secretary of State to perform a ministerial statutory duty: fill out a form to certify 
an act as law. It did not require enactment of a new statute. Idaho Sch. for Equal Educational 
Opportunity v. Evans, 123 Idaho 573, 583-84, 850 P.2d 724,734-35 (1993) (ISSEO I), accepted 
construing the statute not to conflict with the rule; he would not order passage of a new statute. 
• State v. Tucker, 97 Idaho 4, 539 P.2d 556 (1975), articulated the standards to be used to determine 
whether retained trial counsel had provided reasonably competent assistance of counsel; it did not 
address whether the public defense statutes must be changed. 
• Bement v. State, 91 Idaho 388, 422 P.2d 55 (1966), decided whether a young, uneducated defendant 
was properly informed of his statutory right to counsel; it did not order a statutory change. 
• Idaho State AFL-CJO v. Leroy, 110 Idaho 691, 718 P.2d 1129 (1986), decided whether an emergen-
cy clause making an act immediately effective would override another statute that provided that 
laws subject to a referendum would not take effect until after the referendum; it did not involve a 
request to order the enactment of another statute. 
• Miles v. Jdaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 778 P.2d 757 (1989), was a straightforward challenge to 
a statute's constitutionality; it did not request enactment of other statutes. 
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existing statutory and rulemaking definitions for curriculum and books, facilities, and transporta-
tion as consistent with the constitutional definition of a thorough education; it did not require 
new statutes to be enacted to meet a judicial definition of thoroughness. Idaho Sch. for Equal 
Educational Opportunity v. State, 142 Idaho 450, 459-60, 129 P.3d 1199, 1208-09 (2005) 
(ISEEO V), did not order the Legislature to enact new statutes to cure constitutional deficiencies 
in funding safe school facilities whose safety was adjudicated under existing statutes and State 
Board of Education rules. Hellar affirmed the District Court's holding the statute apportioning 
the Legislature was in violation of the Idaho Constitution and ordered that the next Legislature 
be elected under an apportionment adjudicated in the District Court as complying with the State 
and Federal Constitutions. 106 Idaho at 573-76, 682 P.2d at 526-29. Hellar shows that the Dis-
trict Court could order Secretary of State Cenarrusa to perfurm the ministerial act of conducting 
an election under a previously devised plan. It did not order the Legislature to devise a plan. In 
short, none of these cases holds that the District Court may compel the Legislature to enact new 
laws on a given subject. 
Plaintiffs assure the Court that "the remedy [they] seek respects separation of powers": 
they "ask for [l] a declaratory judgment that Idaho's system violates the right to counsel"; "[2] 
an injunction requiring that the State develop and·propose a plan to implement a constitutional 
system" under which "the executive and legislative branches ... would determine [ a J whether 
new legislation would be best or [b J whether, instead, the Governor and the PDC would use their 
existing authority to impose reforms." App.Br., pp. 42-43 (bracketed numbers and letters added). 
In other words, the District Court would enter a declaration judgment that the current system is 
unconstitutional and enjoin the State to fix it by legislation or through executive power. 
These solutions are not compatible with separation of powers. First, Part I.D of this 
Argument, pp. 32-33, infra, shows that the State has sovereign immunity from suit unless statute 
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waives immunity, and the State has not waived immunity here. The District Court cannot enter 
declaratory judgment against the State because of its sovereign immunity. Second, the District 
Court cannot order the Legislative Branch to enact legislation. See pp. 25-26, supra. Third, the 
District Court cannot order the Governor and/or the PDC to exercise executive authority that 
they do not have. See pp. 14-18, supra. 
Plaintiffs cite Harrell-Harring v. State, 15 N.Y.3d 8, 26, 930 N.E.2d 217, 227 (2010) (H-
H), which was a challenge to the provision of public defense services in five New York counties, 
to support their position that "the fact that the court's ruling may necessitate some action on the 
part of the legislature does not absolve the court from issuing such a ruling." App.Br., p. 44, 
quoting H-H. Indeed, H-H refers to possible reordering of legislative priorities, but it is likely 
that the legislatures referred to are county legislatures, not the New York State Legislature. The 
legislative body in many New York counties is called the county legislature, McKinney's County 
Law, § 150-a, not the board of county commissioners as in Idaho. It seems that the quoted para-
graph referred to county legislatures and their priorities when the next paragraph refers to the 
"five subject counties." 14 Ordering counties to comply with State law does not implicate separa-
tion of powers. 
4. Separation of Powers Suggests That This ls Not a Case for Equitable Relief 
Defendants agree that the Legislature and the Governor "are not the final arbiters of 
whether their acts or omissions are constitutional." App.Br., p. 45. But Plaintiffs have not chal-
lenged the constitutionality of statutes placing responsibility for public defense in the counties; 
14 
As shown by their websites, three of the five counties sued have county legislatures: 
Onondaga County: http://www.ongov.net/legislature/ 
Schuyler County: http://www.schuylercounty.us/266/Legislature 
Suffolk County: http://Jegis.suffolkcountyny.gov/legislators.html 
Respondents' Brief - 30 
they have skipped over the issue of whether those statutes can be administered in a constitutional 
manner to argue that the failure to direct or supervise public defense services at the State level is 
unconstitutional. There is simply no precedent for this under Federal law, and there is no reason 
to create a precedent for it under State law when Plaintiffs have ignored their obvious remedy: 
suing a county over the specifics of what the county is or is not doing. 
Article XVIII of the Idaho Constitution is called "County Organization"; § 5 provides for 
the Legislature to establish a system of county government; § 11 provides that "County, town-
ship, and precinct officers shall perform such duties as shall be prescribed by Jaw." Section 22 of 
the Idaho Admission Act provided: "All acts or parts of acts in conflict with the provisions of this 
act, whether passed by the legislature of said territory or by Congress, are hereby repealed." 
Given the Idaho Admission Act's and the Idaho Constitution's recognition that the Legislature 
may devolve duties upon the counties, it would violate separation of powers for the District 
Court to grant equitable relief under Federal or Idaho Jaw to prevent the Legislature from assign-
ing public defense duties to the counties. 
This brings Defendants to another point. Plaintiffs are asking for an equitable remedy. 
Equity is practical; equitable remedies are not given as a matter of right, but only as a matter of 
sound judgment and discretion. E.g., Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 724-25, 
116 S. Ct. 1712, 1724-25 (1996) (under Federal Jaw, there is no entitlement to equitable relief if 
there is a violation of a federal legal right, but a court should exercise its sound discretion to de-
cide whether to grant equitable relief or abstain from exercising jurisdiction); Chavez v. Barrus, 
146 Idaho 212,222, 192 P.3d 1036, 1046 (2008) (similar exercise of judgment for right ofre-
demption of property); Chatterton v. Luker, 66 Idaho 242,258, 158 P.2d 809,816 (1945) (similar 
exercise of judgment for specific performance). Given the entanglement with the Legislature 
process that would ensue if the District Court were to grant the equitable reliefrequested, even if 
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the District Court's separation-of-powers analysis were incorrect (it is not), this would be an ap-
propriate case for the District Court to withhold injunctive relief. 
There is another reason to be cautious. Plaintiffs made no secret below of their goal to 
halt criminal prosecutions of all indigent defendants: 
[The District] Court's declaration that Idaho's system is currently 
operating below constitutional thresholds would have a direct ef-
fect on the plaintiff class because it would require the State to meet 
those thresholds before it could continue to prosecute indigent cri-
minal defendants. Class members could obtain immediate further 
relief based on the judgment, through stays and other appropriate 
temporary relief in their criminal proceedings until the State dis-
patched the resources and rules needed for constitutional compli-
ance. 
Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, R., p. 426 (emphasis added). According to Plain-
tiffs the District Court would enter an injunction and a judgment requiring every class member's 
criminal proceeding in every State court in Idaho to be stayed "until the State dispatched the 
resources and rules needed for constitutional compliance." Equity should not restrain criminal 
proceedings throughout the State. 
In summary, for the reasons stated in Parts I.C.1-4 of this Argument, the Court should 
affirm dismissal of the Complaint on separation-of-powers grounds. 
D. The State Has Sovereign Immunity from Suit, Including Immunity from Declara-
tory Judgment 
The District Court's dismissal of claims for declaratory judgment against the State should 
be affirmed. Idaho is a sovereign State of the Union. Idaho Admission Act, 26 Stat. L. 215, ch. 
656. Section I of that Act "declared Idaho to be a State of the United States of America ... ad-
mitted into the Union on equal footing with the original States" and "the constitution which the 
people of Idaho have formed for themselves ... is hereby accepted, ratified and confirmed." 
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"States entered the Union with their sovereign immunity intact." Virginia Office for Prot. 
& Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 253, 131 S. Ct. 1632, 1637 (2011). Idaho retains its sove-
reign immunity unless the Legislature waives it by statute. Sanchez v. State, Dept of Correction, 
143 Idaho 239, 244-45, 141 P.3d 1108, 1113-14 (2006). Thus, the threshold issue when the State 
is sued is: Has statute waived the State's sovereign immunity not to be sued in this case? The 
answer is no. Thus, no declaratory judgment may be entered against the State of Idaho. 
Further, even if statute had waived immunity from suit, Idaho Code§ 10-1206 authorizes 
the District Court to decline to issue a declaratory judgment "if it would not terminate the uncer-
tainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding." A naked declaratory judgment against the 
State without enforcement power against the Legislature would not end the controversy. This is 
another reason why declaratory judgment should not be issued against the State. 
II. DOJ's AMICUS DOES NOT ADDRESS Two ELEMENTS OF STANDING -
CAUSATION AND REDRESSABILITY-AND URGES ADOPTION OF AN UNPRE-
CEDENTED THEORY OF EXECUTIVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PUBLIC DEFENSE 
SERVICES THAT FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENSE SERVICES CANNOT MEET 
The United States Department of Justice (DOJ) Amicus argues issues that are not before 
the Court -"Whether indigent criminal defendants may bring a civil, pre-conviction claim for 
declaratory and injunctive relief based on constructive denial of counsel under the Sixth Amend-
ment and Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U,S. 335 (1963)," DOJ Amicus, p. 7, and, "whether plain-
tiffs can bring such a constructive-denial-of-counsel claim in a pre-conviction civil action seek-
ing prospective injunctive relief ... ," id. at 19 - while ignoring whether such a claim can be 
brought against the State, the Governor and the PDC Members. DOJ does not grapple with the 
§ 1983 case law to address the real issue before the Court: When Idaho statute provides that the 
counties are responsible for public defense services, can State executive officers be sued for 
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alleged failings of that system? 15 
Further, DOJ does not confine itself to issues of Federal law in which DOJ and the Fed-
eral Government have an interest; it also strays into issues of State Jaw that are none of its con-
cern. And, most importantly, DOJ supports a Complaint based upon an unprecedented theory of 
centralized State control and responsibility for indigent defense services that is inconsistent with 
Federal law and Federal practice, which, like Idaho, provides a decentralized system of public 
defense that is not the Chief Executive's responsibility or subject to his supervision. 
A. DOJ's Cases Do Not Hold That There Is a Federal Constitutional Right to Sue an 
Entire State's System of Providing Public Defense Services 
DOJ makes several misstatements at the outset: 
[I] [T]he district court effectively held that the sole recourse plain-
tiffs have to redress the systemic deficiencies in Idaho's public de-
fense system is through piecemeal, post-conviction litigation of in-
dividual ineffective-assistance of counsel claims under Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) .... [2] Rather, as [New York] 
correctly recognized in [H-H], indigent criminal defendants may 
challenge systemic Gideon violations through pre-conviction, civil 
constructive-denial-of-counsel claims seeking prospective injunc-
tive relief. 
. . . [3 J In ruling that courts are powerless to hear such claims, the 
district court has deprived indigent defendants in Idaho of this es-
sential tool, well-grounded in the law. 
DOJ Amicus, pp. 1-2 (bracketed numbers added). 
DOJ is wrong. First, the District Court did not hold that Idaho Courts are powerless to 
hear Plaintiffs' claims against individual county systems of public defense services. 16 Second, as 
15 DOJ recognizes that State cannot be sued under § 1983. DOJ Amicus, p. 11, n.18. 
16 
The MD&O did not explicitly rule that Plaintiffs could sue county officers, but it did observe: "In-
stead of filing suit against those counties where they believe their constitutional rights have been violated, 
they brought this action against the State, the Governor, and the PDC." MD&O, R., p. 496. Regardless 
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explained below, H-H's ultimate ruling was not based solely on Federal law, but grounded in 
whole or in part in State law, and it did not involve a challenge to a "statewide" system of public 
defense services; it involved a challenge to public defense services in five counties. Third, even 
if Defendants are wrong and the MD&O could be interpreted to preclude systemic challenges to 
a county's public defense services, Defendants do not take that position. 
As for H-H, its remedies were not exclusively based upon Federal law and did not in-
volve a statewide challenge to public defense services. New York's State legislature, like Ida-
ho's, delegated responsibility for public defense to the counties. 15 N.Y.3d at 15,930 N.E.2d at 
2 I 9. Criminal defendants in five New York counties sued because they alleged that the county-
based system "functioned to deprive them and other similarly situated indigent defendants in the 
aforementioned counties of constitutionally and statutorily guaranteed representational rights." 
Id. (emphasis added). H-H called the case a "Sixth Amendment-grounded action," id. at 19,930 
N.E.2d at 222, which stated "cognizable Sixth Amendment claims," id. at 20, 930 N.E.2d at 222, 
but did not ground its remedial authority in§ 1983; it fact, it did not mention§ 1983 at all. H-H 
was based upon a mix of Federal constitutional and State statutory claims: "[N]othing in the 
statute may be read to justify the conclusion that the presence of defense counsel at arraignment 
is ever dispensable .... " Id. at 21, 930 N.E.2d at 223 (emphasis added). "We have consistently 
held that enforcement of a clear constitutional or statutory mandate is the proper work of the 
courts." Id. at 27,930 N.E.2d at 227 (emphasis added). H-H does not explain how the State or 
the Governor may be sued under § I 983 or under State law. 17 Thus, H-H is not a "clean" Sixth 
of whether the MD&O explicitly held that a class action suit could be brought against the counties, it did 
not hold that a class action lawsuit could not be brought against the counties or their officers. 
17 Both the State and the Governor were sued in H-H, see Hurrell-Harring v. State, 66 A.D.3d 84, 85, 
883 N.Y.S.2d 349,350 (2009), but the New York Court of Appeals' opinion does not explain the basis 
for suing either of them under Federal law or State law. 
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Amendment ruling, and it is difficult to know how much, if any, of its remedy is under § 1983 
and how much of its remedy is under New York law. 
DOJ pats itself on the back for its role in various cases regarding public defense services, 
DOJ Amicus, pp. 3-5, but omits the important fact that none of these cases challenged an entire 
State's system of public defense services, and none of them resulted in a judgment on a Federal 
claim against an entire State, a Governor, or a Statewide agency regarding a statewide claim. If 
DOJ is seeking to use Idaho as a guinea pig to see whether it can expand the scope of these kinds 
of cases from local to statewide, at least it should have said so. It did not. 
B. DOJ Addressed Issues of State Law for Which There Is No Federal Interest 
DOJ stated an Issue Presented on Appeal based on the Sixth Amendment, DOJ Amicus, 
p. 7, but as explained in this section of the Brief, it has also discussed matters of purely State law. 
There is no reason for DOJ to weigh in on State law. It is settled law that there is no Federal in-
terest in using Federal Courts to vindicate State law against State officials. 
A federal court's grant of relief against state officials on the basis 
of state law ... does not vindicate the supreme authority of federal 
law. On the contrary, it is difficult to think of a greater intrusion on 
state sovereignty than when a federal court instructs state officials 
on how to conform their conduct to state law. Such a result con-
flicts directly with the principles of federalism that underlie the 
Eleventh Amendment. 
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106, 104 S. Ct. 900,911 (1984). Like-
wise, DOJ's references to the proper construction or administration of State law does nothing to 
advance Federal Supremacy under Article VI, § 2, and, like Pennhurst, it is difficult to think of a 
greater intrusion on state sovereignty than when DOJ instructs this Court how to make Idaho 
Executive Officers conform their conduct to state law. Nevertheless, DOJ repeatedly refers to 
State law in its brief: 
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• DOJ states that Plaintiffs alleged Jack of counsel at initial appearances as required by 
State Jaw: "Unlike the federal system, Idaho Criminal Rule 44(a) entitles indigent defen-
dants to appointed counsel at their initial appearance." DOJ Amicus, p. 8, n.15. 
• DOJ states that "there is continued use in many areas of 'fixed-fee' "public defender 
contracts, "despite the fact that such contracts are prohibited by Idaho Code§ 19-859(4)." 
DOJ Amicus, p. I 0. 18 
• DOJ states that Plaintiffs allege that the PDC failed to meet its State Jaw requirements for 
rulemaking or legislative recommendations. DOJ Amicus, p. I 0, n.17. 
There is no Federal interest in these issues regarding enforcement or application ofldaho statutes 
or court rules. DOJ has overstepped its interest in Federal supremacy. 
DOJ also opined on State Jaw separation of powers principles. DOJ Amicus, pp. 23-24. 
While the question of whether Idaho's provisions for separation of powers would violate the Fed-
eral Constitution in a given fact situation may be a Federal question, there is no Federal interest 
in the purely State Jaw issue of how Idaho separates powers among its branches of government 
and among State and local governments. Cf Pacheco v. Dugger, 850 F.2d 1493, 1495 (11th Cir. 
1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1046, 109 S.Ct. 878 (1989) (distribution of powers among agencies 
and branches of state government does not implicate Federal issues). But DOJ weighs in anyway 
and weighs in incorrectly. 
18 This reference is particularly egregious because DOJ did not undertake a reasonable inquiry to see 
whether fixed fee contracts do indeed violate§ 19-859(4) or whether they are still in use. The 2014 
amendment to subsection (4) provided thatfuture public defender contracts could not be fixed fee: "The 
contract provisions of this subsection shall apply to all contracts entered into or renewed on or after the 
effective date of this act." 2014 ldaho Session Law, Chapter 247, § 5. 
Unsurprisingly, fixed fee contracts in place in 2014 when this amendment was passed were not 
made unlawful, and they took a while to cycle out of the system. The fixed-fee contract issue became 
moot at the end of June 2016. See Minutes of Public Defense Reform Interim Committee: 
http://legislature.idaho.gov/sessioninfo/20 ! 5/interim/150918 pdef other meet time-Minutes.pd[ 
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DOJ says: "Courts are not powerless to compel action by other branches of government 
in order to remedy a constitutional violation. To the contrary, courts have long recognized the 
necessity of systemic equitable relief to correct unconstitutional conduct." DOJ Amicus, p. 23. 
To support of this statement, DOJ cites Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 131 S.Ct. 1910 (2011), and 
H-H. Neither case supports the kind ofrelief sought here. H-H was discussed earlier; it did not 
require the New York State Legislature to take any action. Seep. 30, supra. 
Brown is inapposite. Brown was an appeal from two consolidated cases, one concerning 
whether California prisons were providing required mental health services to seriously mentally 
ill inmates, and another concerning whether California prisons were providing necessary medical 
services to prisoners with serious medical conditions. Plaintiffs in the first case sued a number 
of prison officials with statewide authority, including the Director of the California Department 
of Corrections (DOC), the Assistant Deputy Director for Health Care Services for the California 
DOC, and the Chief of Psychiatric Services for the California DOC. Coleman v. Wilson, 912 
F.Supp. 1282, 1293 (E.D. Cal. 1995), appeal dismissed, 101 F.3d 75 (9th Cir. 1996) (Table). 19 
Unlike this case, the California prison officials in Brown were sued over conditions in facilities 
that they administered (i.e., there was causation), not for conditions in county jails that they did 
not oversee. Further, the Brown defendants could implement the remedy themselves by releasing 
prisoners or providing more services (i.e., there was redressability). Thus, these cases offer no· 
insight on the separation-of-powers issue before this Court: May the District Court issue an 
order that as a practical matter requires legislation to implement because the Defendants sued did 
not cause and cannot remedy the alleged injuries in fact? 
19 
The Governor was also sued. The reasons for keeping him in the suit, 912 F.Supp. at 1317, were 
not based upon his official duties vis-ii-vis California's prisons, but upon his "awareness" about condi-
tions in them. This analysis is not consistent with more recent cases like Canards or Napolitano, supra. 
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DOJ's next cases and argument are no more instructive. DOJ begins with the sophistry 
that the Complaint's "request for relief does not ask the court to enact legislation," but rather 
"seek[s] injunctions 'requiring the State to propose' a plan for reforming its public defense sys-
tem," under which the District Court "would ... approve and monitor the State's plan to assure 
that its meets constitutional standards." DOJ Amicus, p. 24. If this would be possible to imple-
ment without legislation, DOJ does not explain how. DOJ then cites two cases - Swann v. 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. I, 91 S.Ct. 1267 (1971), and Wilbur v. City of 
Mount Vernon, 989 F.Supp.2d 1122 (W.D.Wash. 2013)- that were brought against local gov-
ernments, that did not seek statewide relief, and did not require the State Legislature to act to im-
plement their remedies. These cases do not address the separation-of-powers issue here: Can the 
District Court order relief that, even if not explicitly requiring legislation to implement, can only 
be achieved by legislation? As explained earlier, the answer is no. See pp. 23-26, supra. 
Lastly, DOJ purports to offer a way out of the separation-of-powers problem that it does 
not otherwise acknowledge or discuss: "In any event, any concerns regarding the court's role 
vis-a-vis the legislature at most go to the scope of relief the court might fashion; they do not ren-
der the claim nonjusticiable, as the court ruled here." DOJ Amicus, p. 24. In other words, DOJ 
proposes to read redressability out of the standing requirements for justiciability. Unsurprisingly, 
DOJ cites no cases for removing the third standing requirement from justiciability. 
C. No Court Has Issued a Judgment Requiring a State to Restructure Its Entire Public 
Defense System on the Basis of the Sixth Amendment 
The DOJ Amicus cannot cite any case in which there was a final judgment requiring an 
entire State to revamp its public defense system. The reason why, to the best of Defendants' 
knowledge, is that there is no such case. DOJ, like the Plaintiffs, is asking this Court to make 
Idaho the test case in its experiment to force a statewide public defense solution. 
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Defendants have already explained why H-H is not such a case. Neither are Duncan v. 
State, 284 Mich.App. 246, 774 N.W.2d 89 (2009), and Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012 (11th Cir. 
1988), which are cited at DOJ Amicus, pp. 21-22. DOJ does not even inform the Court that 
Duncans 2009 Michigan Court of Appeals decision went to the Michigan Supreme Court the 
next year and that the ultimate Duncan decision was not grounded in § 1983. 
Duncans sinuous history is reviewed in Duncan v State, 300 Mich.App. 176, 832 N.W.2d 
761 (2012), an opinion on remand from the last of three Michigan Supreme Court decisions on 
appeal from the 2009 decision that DOJ cited. The 2009 Court of Appeals decision allowed the 
State and the Governor to be sued over provision of public defense services in three Michigan 
counties. 284 Mich.App. at 253-254, 774 N.W.2d at 97. The State was sued under the Michigan 
Governmental Tort Liability Act, id. at 266-271, 774 N.W.2d at 104-106, and the Governor was 
sued under§ 1983, id. at 271-276, 774 N.W.2d at 106-109, without any discussion of his author-
ity to redress plaintiffs' claims. The Michigan Court of Appeals was then affirmed, reversed, and 
affirmed by the Supreme Court of Michigan in that order: 
• Duncan v. State, 486 Mich. 906,906, 780 N.W.2d 843, 844 (2010) (Duncan I) (affirming 
"result only of the Court of Appeals majority for different reasons" and "it is premature to 
make a decision on the substantive issues"); 
• Duncan v. State, 486 Mich. 1071, 1071, 784 N.W.2d 51, 51 (2010) (Duncan If) (reversing 
Duncan I: "The defendants are entitled to summary disposition because, as the Court of 
Appeals dissenting opinion recognized, the plaintiffs' claims are not justiciable"); and 
• Duncan v. State, 488 Mich. 957, 866 N.W.2d 407 (2010) (Duncan Ill) ("we REINSTATE 
our order" from Duncan I affirming in result only), 20 
20 The last decision was issued not long before some members of the majority left office and were re-
placed with the winners of an intervening election. As a dissenter to the last opinion explained: 
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as explained in Duncan v. State, 300 Mich.App. at 183-184, 832 N.W.2d at 765. 
Like the New York Court of Appeals in H-H, the Michigan Supreme Court never ruled 
whether § 1983 gave the plaintiffs the right to sue the State or the Governor. DOJ may be right 
that Duncan stands for the proposition that "plaintiffs state a valid civil claim where they allege 
an actual denial of counsel, a constructive denial of counsel, or conflicted counsel," DOJ Ami-
cus, p. 21, but it is not clear whether Duncan is grounded in Federal or State law or whether 
Duncan is based at all upon § 1983 or whether it would sanction a Statewide suit. What a slen-
der reed for DOJ to grasp! 
Luckey is no better. The Luckey plaintiffs sued the Governor of Georgia, two chief judges 
of Georgia judicial circuits, and "all Georgia judges responsible for providing assistance of coun-
sel to indigents criminally accused in the Georgia courts." 860 F.2d at 1013. The Eleventh Cir-
cuit ruled that the defendants were proper because "the governor is responsible for law enforce-
ment ... and is charged with executing the laws faithfully ... [and] has the residual power to 
commence criminal prosecutions ... and has the final authority to direct the Attorney General to 
'institute and prosecute' on behalf of the state .... Judges are responsible for administering the 
system ofrepresentation for the indigent criminally accused." Id.at 1016. The Court did not ex-
plain how the Governor could wear two hats and be responsible for prosecution and for public 
defense. In the end, however, this case never proceeded to judgment. Four years later the Ele-
venth Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision to abstain from considering the Luckey com-
plaint and to dismiss the complaint. Luckey v. Miller, 976 F.2d 673 (11th Cir. 1992). Like Eu, 
The majority has decided to grant the motion for reconsideration, and to reverse our previous 
order, without affording disagreeing Justices sufficient time to adequately respond to this de-
cision. Instead, the majority has now decided to expedite the release of its order . . . . . .. The 
Court's decision to suddenly expedite this case seems designed to prevent the new Court af-
ter January I, 2011 from considering a motion for reconsideration. 
Duncan Ill, 488 Mich. 957, 958, 866 N.W.2d 407, 407-408 (2010) (Corrigan, J., dissenting). 
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this is another case where no Governor was ordered to do anything in the end.21 DOJ has not 
found any cases in which a judgment explicitly grounded in § 1983 ordered a Governor or anoth-
er Statewide officer to remedy a supposedly unconstitutional system of public defense adminis-
tered at the local level. In the absence of binding precedent from the United States Supreme 
Court that such a judgment is possible under the law, this case should not be the first. 
As for cases like H-H or Duncan being "correctly reasoned," DOJ Amicus, p. 20, that 
view is not universal. Flora v. Luzerne County, 103 A.3d 125, 134-137 (Pa.Commw. 2014), 
noted that H-H was a 4-3 decision and that Duncan was 2-1 in the Court of Appeals and con-
cluded that the dissents were better reasoned, in part because: 
21 
Unlike Duncan, DOJ acknowledges Luckey 's subsequent history- dismissal on grounds of ab-
stention - but assures that Court that Luckey 's "initial opinion remains good law." DOJ Amicus, p. 22, 
n.20. DOJ cites nothing to back up that statement. This is how Harris v. McDonnell, 988 F .Supp.2d 603 
(W.D.Vir. 2013), analyzed Luckey's "good law"; after reviewing pages of cases holding that a Governor 
cannot be sued just because he or she is the Chief Executive when the plaintiff claims that a state law is 
unconstitutional, the court addressed the anomalous Luckey opinion: 
Plaintiffs also cite Luckey ... , ... which ... held that the ... Governor was a proper party un-
der Ex parte Young for a suit challenging the adequacy of the state's indigent defense fund-
ing. It is difficult to square ... Luckey with Fourth Circuit precedent, and it is questionable 
whether the Fourth Circuit would have reached the same result. Regardless, even in the Ele-
venth Circuit, Luckey has not been read to apply the Ex parte Young exception to a Governor 
where there is a less senior state official with more direct responsibility for the challenged 
action. See Women's Emergency Network v. Bush, 214 F.Supp.2d 1316, 1317-18 (S.D.Fla. 
2002) (dismissing the Governor ... and fmding the Executive Director.of the [Highway De-
partment] the proper defendant for Ex parte Young purposes in a suit challenging the issu-
ance of certain state license plates). Indeed, ... the Eleventh Circuit in Women's Emergency 
Network held, consistent with the court's ruling herein, as follows: 
A governor's "general executive power" is not a basis for jurisdiction in most circum-
stances. If a governor's general executive power provided a sufficient connection to a 
state Jaw to permit jurisdiction over him, any state statute could be challenged simply 
by naming the governor as a defendant. Where the enforcement of a statute is the re-
sponsibility of parties other than the governor (the cabinet in this case), the governor's 
general executive power is insufficient to confer jurisdiction. 
323 F.3d 937, 949-950 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted). 
988 F.Supp.2d at 610-611, n.3. Luckey's status as "good law" is highly questionable. 
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First, there is no precedent from the United States Supreme Court 
acknowledging that a constructive denial of counsel claim may be 
brought in a civil case that seeks prospective relief in the form of 
more funding and resources to an entire office, as opposed to relief 
to individual indigent criminal defendants. Strickland, Cronic, and 
Gideon were all cases where the defendants sought a new trial. As 
explained in the Duncan dissent, the "United States Supreme Court 
in Gideon and Strickland was concerned with results, not process. 
It did not presume to tell the states how to ensure that indigent cri-
minal defendants receive effective assistance of counsel." Duncan, 
774 N.W.2d at 153 (Whitbeck, J., dissenting). It is unclear that 
such a claim will be held cognizable in any state. 
I 03 A.3d at 136. Thus, in the end there is no basis for allowing suit against some State officer 
just because Plaintiffs have alleged a statewide, systemic problem. Instead, Plaintiffs must show 
that their suit satisfies the causation and redressability element of standing to see these Defend-
ants. They have not. This Court should affirm the District Court's dismissal of the Complaint. 
D. The Federal Public Defense System, Like Idaho's, Is Decentralized and Not Answer-
able to the Chief Executive or Any Other Executive Officer 
One of the ironies ofDOJ's Amicus is that it supports a challenge to Idaho's organization 
of public defense services that parallels the Federal organization for public defense services. 
Both systems are decentralized: Idaho's system is organized by county, although counties may 
band together to provide public defense services. Idaho Code§§ 19-859 through 19-861. The 
Federal system is organized by judicial district, although public defender services may be provid-
ed for part of a judicial district or for adjacent judicial districts. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(g)(2)(A). 
Neither the Chief Executive (the Governor or the President) nor any other Executive Officer with 
sovereign-wide authority is responsible for supervising public defense services. In Idaho, county 
commissioners are responsible for seeing that public defense services are provided. Idaho Code 
§§ 19-859 through 19-861. Federal public defense services "shall be supervised by a Federal 
Public Defender appointed by the court of appeals of the circuit." 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(g)(2)(A). 
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Given the peculiar posture of DOJ's support of a Complaint that challenged a public de-
fense structure so much like that of the Federal system, Defendants posed the following question 
in response to DOJ's Motion for Leave to File Brief as Amicus Curiae: 
... [ A Jn analogous suit in the federal system ... would be four 
plaintiffs, each from a different State or Territory, claiming that 
they were denied various pre-trial constitutionally required public 
defender services, and they would sue the United States of Amer-
ica, the President, and some statutory officers that the plaintiffs 
claimed were responsible for public defender services in all States 
and Territories of the United States. The United States could 
illuminate the issues that will actually be before the Court on 
appeal by briefing each of the following three questions: 
(a) Would the United States of America be subject to a suit 
claiming a systemic nationwide failure to provide constitu-
tionally required public defender services ... ? 
(b) Would the President of the United States be subject to a 
suit claiming a systemic nationwide failure to provide con-
stitutionally required public defender services ... ? If so, 
under what statutory or constitutional provisions would 
such a suit be brought? 
(c) Is there an officer or are their officers of the United 
States who would be subject to a suit claiming a systemic 
nationwide failure to provide constitutionally required 
public defender services ... ? Ifso, who are they, and 
under what statutory or constitutional provisions would 
such a suit be brought? 
Defendants-Respondents' Response to United States of America's Motion for Leave to File Brief 
as Amicus Curiae, pp. 3-4. 
Rather than address these important parallels between the Idaho and Federal systems for 
public defense services and provide this Court with any insights that it might have, DOJ filed a 
Supplemental I.A.R. 8 Motion for Leave to File Brief as Amicus Curiae, which was accompanied 
by DO J's boilerplate brief that ignored the most important issue before the Court: Are there any 
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officers who can be sued in an attempt to create a sovereign-wide challenge to a decentralized 
system of public defense? DOJ's telling omissions are all the more reasons to affirm the District 
Court, in no small part because the decentralized Federal system for providing public defense 
services is organized so much like the Idaho system. 
III. THE NACDL/IACDLAMICUS DOES NOT ADDRESS THE STANDING 
ELEMENTS OF CAUSATION AND REDRESSABILITY 
The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL)/Idaho Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers (IACDL) Amicus (CDL Amicus) focuses on one element of standing 
- injury in fact - that Defendants do not contest while ignoring the two elements of standing 
that are central to this appeal-causation and redressability. CDLAmicus, pp. 6-19. Further, 
NACDL and IACDL do not address whether it is possible to sue the State for injunctive relief 
under Idaho or Federal law. They say that "in similar cases, plaintiffs have been allowed to pur-
sue such claims in both federal and state courts." CDLAmicus, p. 6. But, the cases that they cite 
are not similar because they do not involve Statewide challenges to public defense services 
brought against executive officers based upon § 1983 or State law that is comparable to Idaho's. 
For purposes of this appeal, the Court may assume that the injuries in fact described at 
CDLAmicus, pp. 6-19, would satisfy the first element of standing if the Complaint had been 
brought against persons who caused the injuries in fact and who could redress the injuries in fact. 
Those pages of the CDLAmicus are not further discussed. 
H-H, discussed at CDLAmicus, pp. 19-20, is not explicitly grounded in§ 1983, did not 
discuss what Federal or State law principles allowed suit against the State or the Governor, and 
was not a Statewide challenge to a public defense system. See discussions, pp. 30, 34-35, 42, 
supra. It is not similar to this case. Neither is Duncan, 284 Mich.App. 246, 774 N.W.2d 89, 
discussed at CDLAmicus, pp. 20-21; Duncan was not explicitly grounded in§ 1983 by the 
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Michigan Supreme Court, did not discuss what Federal or State laws allowed suit against the 
State or against the Governor, and was not a Statewide challenge to the public defense system. 
See discussions, pp. 40-41, supra. Luckey, discussed at CDLAmicus, p. 21, did not lead to a 
judgment with Statewide effect; in fact, it led to no judgment at all when it was dismissed on 
abstention grounds. See discussion, pp. 40-42, supra. Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon, 989 · 
F.Supp.2d 1122 (W.D.Wash. 2013), and Phillips v. California, Cal.Sup.Crt., Fresno County, Case 
No. 15CECG02201 (2016), discussed at CDLAmicus, pp. 21-22, involved public defense ser-
vices in a city and a county, respectively, not a Statewide challenge to public defense services. 
Thus, the CDL Amicus does not identify any "similar cases" in which plaintiffs "have been 
allowed to pursue such claims in both federal and state courts." The CDL Amicus does not make 
arguments overlooked by the Plaintiffs and the DOJ, and it should not be the basis for reversing 
and remanding. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should affirm the District Court's Judgment of dismissal. R., p. 500. Ordinar-
ily, the conclusion to a brief is nothing more than a simple declarative sentence like the preced-
ing one. This is not an ordinary case. It is the unusual one where further comment is in order. 
· Plaintiffs say that "separation of powers ... does not absolve this Court of its fundamental 
responsibility to examine and decide complaints alleging the violation of individual rights." 
App.Br., p. 41. Yes, if a case is brought against proper defendants and asks for relief that does 
not intrude upon the Legislative Power. Before a Court can vindicate rights, however, it must de-
termine that the controversy is between the parties before it, not with some other parties. "A 
plaintiff's failure to name the proper defendant is fatal to the claim." HealthNow New York, Inc. 
v. New York, 739 F.Supp.2d 286,295 (W.D.N.Y. 2010), aff'd, 448 F.App'x 79 (2nd Cir. 2011) 
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(citation and internal punctuation omitted) (complaint dismissed because New York Attorney 
General did not have enforcement power for statute that was the subject of the suit). Likewise, 
this Complaint should be dismissed for lack of proper defendants. No case holds, in Plaintiffs' 
words, that "the question is which state official can be sued when the State fails to meet its con-
stitutional obligation." App.Br., p. 46. No case holds that the State is constitutionally required to 
have an officer at the State level who can be sued to implement a constitutional right. 
In the end, Plaintiffs' argument is that two constitutional wrongs make a right. Their 
claim of constitutionally inadequate public defense services is the first constitutional "wrong". 
Toe remedy of suing Executive Officers to obtain Legislative remedies is the second constitu-
tional "wrong". Together, under Plaintiffs' theories, these two constitutional "wrongs" make a 
constitutional "right". They do not. The Complaint should be dismissed because Plaintiffs have 
sued the wrong Defendants - Defendants who did not cause the injuries that Plaintiffs identified 
and who cannot provide the relief they seek. 
Dated this 12th day of July, 2016. 
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Appendix 
2016 House Bill 504, 
2016 Idaho Session Law, Chapter 195 
Appendix 

LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Sixty-third Legislature Second Regular Session - 2016 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
HOUSE BILL NO. 504 
BY JUDICIARY, RULES, AND ADMINISTRATION COMMITTEE 
AN ACT 
2 RELATING TO PUBLIC DEFENSE; AMENDING SECTION 19-850, IDAHO CODE, TO REVISE 
3 POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE PUBLIC DEFENSE COMMISSION, TO PROVIDE THAT THE 
4 COMMISSION SHALL HAVE CERTAIN DUTIES AND TO PROVIDE THAT THE COMMISSION 
5 SHALL HAVE CERTAIN POWERS; AMENDING SECTION 19-851, IDAHO CODE, TO DE-
6 FINE TERMS; AMENDING SECTION 19-853, IDAHO CODE, TO REVISE TERMINOLOGY; 
7 AMENDING SECTION 19-862, IDAHO CODE, TO REVISE A PROVISION REGARDING 
8 APPROPRIATION FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE PROVIDERS AND TO PROVIDE THAT THE 
9 BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS IS NOT REQUIRED TO EXPEND ITS FULL LOCAL 
10 SHARE UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS; AMENDING CHAPTER 8, TITLE 19, IDAHO 
11 CODE, BY THE ADDITION OF A NEW SECTION 19-862A, IDAHO CODE, TO REQUIRE 
12 COMPLIANCE WITH INDIGENT DEFENSE STANDARDS, TO PROVIDE FOR INDIGENT 
13 DEFENSE GRANTS, TO PROVIDE APPLICATION PROCEDURES FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE 
14 GRANTS AND TO PROVIDE PROCEDURES FOR NONCOMPLIANCE WITH INDIGENT DE-
15 FENSE STANDARDS; AND AMENDING SECTION 19-864, IDAHO CODE, TO REVISE 
16 REPORTING REQUIREMENTS. 
17 Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho: 
18 SECTION 1. That Section 19-850, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby 
19 amended to read as follows: 
20 19-850. POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE STATE PUBLIC DEFENSE COMMISSION. ( 1) 
21 The state public defense commission shall: 
22 (a) Promulgate rules in accordance with the provisions of chapter 52, 
23 title 67, Idaho Code, establishing the following: 
24 ( i) Training and continuing legal education requirements for de-
25 fending attorneys, which shall promote competency and consistency 
26 in case types including, but not limited to, criminal, juvenile, 
27 capital, abuse and neglect, post-conviction, civil commitmentr 
28 ea13ital and eivil criminal contempt; iH'H'! 
29 (ii) Uniform data reporting requirements and model forms for the 
30 annual reports submitted pursuant to section 19-864, Idaho Code~ 
31 TAe aata re13ertea, which shall include, but not be limited to, 
32 caseload, workload and expendi tures1. 
33 (iii) Model contracts and core requirements for contracts between 
34 counties and private attorneys for the provision of indigent de-
35 fense services, which shall include, but not be limited to, com-
36 pliance with indigent defense standards; 
37 (iv) Procedures and forms by which counties may apply to the com-
38 mission, pursuant to section 19-862A, Idaho Code, for funds to be 
39 used to bring their delivery of indigent defense services into 
40 compliance with applicable indigent defense standards; 
41 M Procedures for administrative review and fair hearings in ac-




















































include, but not be limited to, providing for a neutral hearing of-
ficer in such hearings; 
(vi) Procedures for the oversight, implementation, enforcement 
and modification of indigent defense standards so that the right 
to counsel of indigent persons, as provided in section 19-852, 
Idaho Code, is constitutionally delivered to all indigent persons 
in this state; and 
(vii) Standards for defending attorneys that utilize, to the ex-
tent reasonably practicable taking into consideration factors 
such as case complexity, support services and travel, the follow-
ing principles: 
l.:._ The delivery of indigent defense services should be inde-
pendent of political and judicial influence, though the ju-
diciary is encouraged to contribute information and advice 
concerning the deli very of indigent defense services. 
~ Defending attorneys should have sufficient time and pri-
vate physical space so that attorney-client confidentiality 
is safeguarded during meetings with clients. 
l..:_ Defending attorneys' workloads should permit effective 
representation. 
i.,_ Economic disincentives or incentives that impair defend-
ing attorneys' ability to provide effective representation 
should be avoided. 
-2..:_ Defending attorneys' abilities, training and experience 
should match the nature and complexity of the cases in which 
they provide services including, but not limited to, cases 
involving complex felonies, juveniles and child protection. 
£.:. The defending attorney assigned to a particular case 
should, to the extent reasonably practicable, continuously 
oversee the representation of that case and personally ap-
pear at every substantive court hearing. 
2-"- There should be reasonable equity between defending 
attorneys and prosecuting attorneys with respect to re-
sources, staff and facilities. 
§_,_ Defending attorneys should obtain continuing legal edu-
cation relevant to their indigent defense cases. 
2-.:_ Defending attorneys should be regularly reviewed and 
supervised for compliance with indigent defense standards 
and, if applicable, compliance with indigent defense stan-
dards as set forth in contractual provisions. 
10. Defending attorneys should identify and resolve con-
flicts of interest in conformance with the Idaho rules of 
professional conduct and other applicable constitutional 
standards. 
Violation of or noncompliance with the principles listed in this 
subparagraph does not constitute ineffective assistance of coun-
sel under the constitutions of the United States or the state of 





















































(b) On or before January 20, 2015, and by January 20 of each year there-
after as deemed necessary by the commission, make recommendations to 
the Idaho legislature for legislation on public defense system issues 
including, but not limited to: 
( i) Ce.-e .-eEjui.-emeRts fe.- eent.-aets eetweeR eeunties aRE! p.-ivate 
attorReys for t~e provision of iREiirgent Eiefease oer7• ices aad 13ro 
poses FReEicl coFJ.t.Eaets feF counties 1::e use, 
(ii) Q1:1alifieati0F1S aB9: euF'erienee staHdaFEis fer tfie 13u1slie Eie 
fca9.eE aad dcfeaelin§ atterF1cys1 
(iii) Enforcement mechanisms; and 
(-i-vii) Funding issues including, but not limited to+, formulas 
for the calculation of local shares and state indigent defense 
grants 
1. TraiRiH§ aad eentinuiR§ le§al cclueatioB fer eiefeadiR§ 
attoracys1 
2. Data eelleetioa and Eepertifl§ efforts, aaEi 
3. GoRfliet eases. 
(c) Review indigent defense providers and defending attorneys to eval-
uate compliance with indigent defense standards and the terms of state 
indigent defense grants. 
J.Ql Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (a) (iv) of this sub-
section, establish temporary procedures and model foms by which coun-
ties may apply to the commission for state indigent defense grants pur-
suant to section 19-862A, Idaho Code, to be utilized until rules promul-
gated pursuant to paragraph (a) (iv) of this subsection are in full force 
and effect. Such temporary procedures shall not be subject to adminis-
trative or judicial review. 
M Hold at least one ( 1) meeting in each calendar quarter. 
(2) The state public defense commission may: 
(a) Hire an executive director who shall be responsible for the per-
formance of the regular administrative functions of the commission and 
other duties as the commission may direct. The executive director shal 1 
be a nonclassified state employee and shall be compensated as deter-
mined by the commission. 
(b) Employ persons in addition to the executive director in other po-
sitions or capacities as it deems necessary to the proper conduct of 
commission business and to the fulfillment of the commission's respon-
sibilities. The employees of the commission other than the executive 
director shall be classified employees and shall receive as compen-
sation an annual salary payable on regular pay periods, the amount of 
which shall be determined by the commission. 
(c) Provide an office, office equipment and facilities as may be rea-
sonably necessary for the proper performance of its duties or the duties 
of the executive director and other personnel. 
J.Ql Provide training and continuing legal education for indigent de-
fense providers and defending attorneys in order to assist them in sat-
isfying requirements promulgated pursuant to subsection (1) (a) (i) of 
this section, and use moneys received from a grant or trust or otherwise 












~ Establish procedures by which indigent defense providers may ap-
ply to the commission for funds to be used for extraordinary litigation 
costs including, but not limited to, expert witnesses, evidence testing 
and investigation, but not including expenses associated with capital 
crimes. 
ill Hire private counsel to represent the commission in hearings held 
in accordance with the Idaho administrative procedure act and the rules 
promulgated pursuant to subsection ( 1) (a) (v) of this section. 
SECTION 2. That Section 19-851, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby 







































19-851. RIGHT TO REPRESENTATION BY COUNSEL -- DEFINITIONS. In this 
act, the term: 
(1) "Commission" means the state public defense commission as created 
pursuant to section 19-849 1 Idaho Code; 
ill "Defending attorney" means any attorney employed by Ui.e effiee sf 
pn:1:Blie Eiefeaeicr, eentraete9. by tfle ee1:1nty an indigent defense provider or 
otherwise assigned to represent adults or juveniles at public expense; 
(;.1) "Detain" means to have in custody or otherwise deprive of freedom 
of action; 
(~i) "Expenses," when used with reference to representation under this 
act, includes the expenses of investigation, other preparation and trial; 
ill "Indigent defense provider" means any agency, entity, organization 
or person selected by a board of county commissioners in accordance with sec-
tion 19-859, Idaho Code, or a designee of the commission if the commission's 
actions to remedy specific deficiencies pursuant to section 19-862A(ll) (b) 
1 
Idaho Code, involve the direct provision of indigent defense services, as a 
means to provide for the representation of indigent persons and other indi-
viduals who are entitled to be represented by an attorney at public expense; 
ill "Indigent defense standard" means any rule promulgated by the com-
mission pursuant to section 19-850 (1) (a) 1 Idaho Code; 
(42) "Indigent person" means a person who, at the time his need is de-
termined pursuant to section 19-854, Idaho Code, is unable to provide for the 
full payment of an attorney and all other necessary expenses of representa-
tion; 
ill "Local share" means the benchmark figure calculated by the commis-
sion to determine the minimum amount of county funding that shall be main-
tained by a county and to determine the award amount of state indigent de-
fense grants for which a county may be eligible pursuant to section 19-862A, 
Idaho Code. For any given county fiscal year, a county's local share shall 
be the median of the annual amount in county funds expended by that county for 
indigent defense during each of the first three (3) of the preceding five (5) 
county fiscal years, as certified by the county clerk. In calculating this 
amount, county indigent defense expenditures shall not include: 
ill Amounts received from the public defense commission; and 
J..£1.. Amounts expended for capital cases by those counties participat-
ing in the capital crimes defense program in excess of premiums and de-
ductibles required by guidelines approved by the Idaho capital crimes 








(-&~) "Serious crime" means any offense the penalty for which includes 
the possibility of confinement, incarceration, imprisonment or detention in 
a correctional facility, regardless of whether actually imposed1_ 
J.lQl "State indigent defense grant" means the state funding a county may 
be awarded pursuant to section 19-8 62A, Idaho Code. 
SECTION 3. That Section 19-853, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby 
7 amended to read as follows: 
8 19-853. DUTY TO NOTIFY ACCUSED OR DETAINED OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL. (1) If 
9 a person who is being detained by a law enforcement officer, or who is con-
10 fined or who is the subject of hospitalization proceedings pursuant to sec-
11 tion 66-322, 66-326, 66-329, 66-404 or 66-406, Idaho Code, or who is under 
12 formal charge of having committed, or is being detained under a conviction 
13 of, a serious crime, is not represented by an attorney under conditions in 
14 which a person having his own counsel would be entitled to be so represented, 
15 the law enforcement officers concerned, upon commencement of detention, or 
16 the court, upon formal charge or hearing, as the case may be, shall: 
17 (a) Clearly inform him of his right to counsel and of the right of an 
18 indigent person to be represented by an attorney at public expense; and 
19 (b) If the person detained or charged does not have an attorney, no-
20 tify the eefeaaia~ atteEaey indigent defense provider or trial court 
21 concerned, as the case may be, that he is not so represented. As used 
22 in this subsection, the term "conunencement of detention" includes the 
23 taking into custody of a probationer. 
24 (2) Upon commencement of any later judicial proceeding relating to the 
25 same matter including, but not limited to, preliminary hearing, arraign-
26 ment, trial, any post-conviction proceeding or post-commitment proceeding, 
27 the presiding officer shall clearly inform the person so detained or charged 
28 of his right to counsel and of the right of an indigent person to be repre-
29 sented by an attorney at public expense. Provided, the appointment of an 
30 attorney at public expense in uniform post-conviction procedure act pro-
31 ceedings shall be in accordance with section 19-4 904, Idaho Code. 
32 (3) If a court determines that the person is entitled to be represented 
33 by an attorney at public expense, it shall promptly notify the eefeaeia~ at 
34 teEae; indigent defense provider. 
35 (4) Upon notification by the court or assignment under this section, 
36 the eefeaaia~ atteEBe) indigent defense provider shall represent the person 
37 with respect to whom the notification is made. 
38 SECTION 4. That Section 19-862, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby 







19-862. APPROPRIATION FOR PUBLIC DEFENDER PRIVATE CONTRIBU-
TIONS. (1) The board of county commissioners of each county shall annually 
appropriate enough money to aeffl:iaister fund the F3re~raffl: ef reI3reseatatiea 
indigent defense provider that it has eleetea selected under section 19-859, 
Idaho Code, and, except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, shall 



















































(2) The board of county commissioners is not required to expend its full 
local share if it can comply with indigent defense standards for less than 
that share. 
(3) If the board of county commissioners of a county elects to estab-
lish and maintain an office of public defender or a joint office of public 
defender, the county may accept private contributions toward the support of 
the office. 
SECTION 5. That Chapter 8, Title 19, Idaho Code, be, and the same is 
hereby amended by the addition thereto of a NEW SECTION, to be known and des-
ignated as Section 19-862A, Idaho Code, and to read as follows: 
19-862A. COMPLIANCE -- INDIGENT DEFENSE GRANTS. (1) All counties, in-
digent defense providers and defending attorneys shall cooperate and par-
ticipate with the commission in the review of their indigent defense ser-
vices. 
(2) On or before August 1, 2016, and by May 1 of each year thereafter, 
each county may submit to the commission an application for a state indigent 
defense grant that shall include a plan that specifically addresses how in-
digent defense standards shall be met and, if applicable under subsection 
(11) (a) of this section, how any deficiencies previously identified by the 
commission will be cured in the upcoming county fiscal year. The applica-
tion shall also include a cost analysis that shall specifically identify the 
amount of funding in excess of the applicable local share, if any, necessary 
to allow the county to successfully execute its plan. In the event the com-
mission has not yet promulgated any indigent defense standards, or the com-
mission determines that the county can successfully execute its plan without 
exhausting the entirety of the grant for which it may be eligible, an appli-
cation submitted pursuant to this section may request funding to be used for 
other improvements to its delivery of indigent defense services. Such other 
improvements may include, but are not limited to, funding for investigation 
costs, witness expenses and other extraordinary litigation costs. 
( 3) The amount of a state indigent defense grant shall not exceed fif-
teen percent (15%) of the county's local share for said county fiscal year or 
twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000), whichever is greater. If a county 
elects to join with the board of county commissioners of one ( 1) or more other 
counties within the same judicial district to establish and maintain a joint 
office of public defender pursuant to section 19-859(2), Idaho Code, each 
participating county shall be eligible for an additional twenty-five thou-
sand dollars ($25,000) per year. The maximum amount of a state indigent de-
fense grant shall remain in effect until July 1, 2019, unless otherwise ad-
dressed by the legislature prior to that date. 
(4) The commission shall approve an application submitted under sub-
section (2) of this section, in an amount deemed appropriate by the commis-
sion, if the application: 
(a) Includes a plan that is necessary to meet or improve upon indigent 
defense standards; and 
(b) Demonstrates that the amount of the requested state indigent de-




1 ( 5) The commission shall approve or disapprove the application submit-
2 ted under subsection (2) of this section within sixty ( 60) days of the sub-
3 mission of the application. If the commission disapproves the application, 
4 the county shall consult with the commission and submit a revised applica-
5 tion within thirty ( 30) days of the mailing date of the official notification 
6 of the commission's disapproval. If after two (2) revisions a resolution is 
7 not reached, any dispute shall be resolved in accordance with the Idaho ad-
8 ministrative procedure act and rules promulgated by the commission pursuant 
9 to section 19-850(1) (a) (v), Idaho Code. 
10 ( 6) On October 1, 2016, or as soon thereafter as is practicable, and on 
11 October 1 of each year thereafter, or as soon thereafter as is practicable, 
12 the commission shall distribute the approved state indigent defense grant to 
13 a county if: 
14 (a) The most recent annual report required by section 19-864, Idaho 
15 Code, has been filed, to the satisfaction of the commission; 
16 (b) The county has filed, to the satisfaction of the commission, its 
17 most recent application for a state indigent defense grant required by 
18 subsection (2) of this section; and 
19 (c) The county has cured, to the satisfaction of the commission, any ma-
20 terial breach of the terms of a previously approved state indigent de-
21 fense grant. 
22 (7) On or before September 1, 2016, and by September 1 of each year 
23 thereafter, the commission shall submit a report with its annual budget 
24 request to the office of the administrator of the division of financial man-
25 agement and the legislative services office requesting the appropriation 
26 of funds necessary to provide state indigent defense grants to counties as 
27 approved by the commission. The information used to create this report shall 
28 be made available to the administrator of the division of financial manage-
29 ment and the legislative services office. 
30 ( 8) A county may be required to provide indigent defense funds in excess 
31 of its local share in the event the cost of successfully executing its plan 
32 submitted pursuant to subsection (2) exceeds the sum of its local share and 
33 the maximum state indigent defense grant for which it may be eligible in a 
34 given county fiscal year. 
35 (9) By March 31 of each year, all counties shall be in compliance with 
36 indigent defense standards that were in full force and effect as of May 1 of 
37 the prior year. 
38 (10) Each application submitted pursuant to subsection (2) of this sec-
39 tion after March 31, 2017, shall contain an attestation stating whether the 
40 county has complied with indigent defense standards as required by subsec-
41 tion (9) of this section and, if not, a specific explanation for its failure 
42 to do so. 
43 (11) In the event the commission determines that any county has failed 
44 to materially comply with indigent defense standards, the commission shall: 
45 (a) Require the county's upcoming state indigent defense grant appli-
46 cation to specifically address how the noncompliance will be cured in 
47 the upcoming county fiscal year as provided in subsection (2) of this 
48 section; or 
49 (b) If any county has willfully and materially failed to comply with 
50 indigent defense standards, notify the county in writing of its de-

8 
termination and intent to remedy specific deficiencies at the expense 
2 of the county to the extent necessary to comply with indigent defense 
3 standards. Within thirty (30) days of the date of said notice, the 
4 commission and the county or their designees shall attempt to meet at 
5 least once to resolve the issues of the noncompliance. If the com-
6 mission and the county are unable to resolve the matter through this 
7 meeting process, the commission and county shall mutually set a date 
8 for mediation within forty-five (45) days, with the cost of mediation 
9 to be paid equally by the parties. If after mediation the commission 
10 and the county are unable to come to a resolution, the commission shall 
11 provide written notice to the county of its decision to remedy specific 
12 deficiencies at the expense of the county to the extent necessary to 
13 comply with indigent defense standards. This decision is subject to 
14 administrative review as provided in subsection (13) of this section. 
15 If the county does not timely request administrative review or if the 
16 administrative review process affirms the commission's determination, 
17 the commission shall remedy specific deficiencies at the expense of the 
18 county to the extent necessary to comply with indigent defense stan-
19 dards. 
20 (12) If the commission acts to remedy specific deficiencies as pro-
21 vided in subsection (11) (b) of this section, the county shall pay to the 
22 commission, notwithstanding the county's applicable local share, the amount 
23 incurred by the commission in remedying specific deficiencies as billed by 
24 the commission on a semiannual basis coinciding with the county fiscal year. 
25 Such amount shall be paid to the commission within sixty ( 60) days of the date 
26 of the billing. If the county fails to provide the commission with the funds 
27 billed pursuant to this subsection within sixty (60) days of the date of 
28 the commission's billing, the state treasurer shall immediately intercept 
29 any payments from sales tax moneys that would be distributed to the county 
30 pursuant to section 63-3638, Idaho Code, and apply the intercepted payments 
31 to reimburse the commission for the costs incurred in remedying specific 
32 deficiencies as billed pursuant to this subsection. The foregoing intercept 
33 and transfer provisions shall operate by force of law and no consent thereto 
34 is required of the county in order to be enforceable. The corrunission and the 
35 state have no obligation to the county or to any person or entity to replace 
36 any moneys intercepted under the authority of this subsection. 
37 ( 13) A county aggrieved by a decision made by the commission pursuant to 
38 subsection (11) (b) of this section shall be afforded reasonable notice and 
39 opportunity for a fair hearing in accordance with the Idaho administrative 
40 procedure act and rules promulgated by the commission pursuant to section 
41 19-850 (1) (a) (v), Idaho Code. 
42 ( 14) If the commission's actions to remedy specific deficiencies, pur-
43 suant to subsection (11) (b) of this section, involve providing indigent de-
44 fense services on behalf of a county, the county may submit an application 
45 for a state indigent defense grant in accordance with subsection (2) of this 
46 section and request to resume providing indigent defense services. The com-
47 mission may approve the application and permit the county to resume provid-
48 ing indigent defense services in the event the county has demonstrated that 
49 it has cured or will cure any material noncompliance with indigent defense 
50 standards to the satisfaction of the commission. 

9 
1 ( 15) Failure to comply with the standards promulgated pursuant to sec-
2 tion 19-850 (1) (a), Idaho Code, or the terms of a state indigent defense grant 
3 does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel under the constitu-
4 tions of the United States or the state of Idaho. 
5 SECTION 6. That Section 19-864, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby 













19-8 64. RECORDS OF DEFENDING ATTORNEYS -- ANNUAL REPORT OF DEFENDING 
ATTORNEYS. (1) A Indigent defense providers and defending attorney~ shall 
keep appropriate records respecting each person whom !,e they represent-& un-
der this act. 
(2) On or before November 1 of each year, indigent defense providers and 
any dBefending attorney-& whose information is not otherwise included in a 
report from an indigent defense provider shall submit an annual report to the 
board of county commissioners ttfiElL the appropriate administrative district 
judge sfiowiag tfle Fn:1If\£ler of pcFseHs FcpreoeBteB. 1.:1nder tfiis act, tfle eriFRes 
iHvelvea aREl: tfie en13eRditures, :tetaleEi by hiHEi , maEie ifl earryiR~ out tFle re 
s13easilailities iH113esea lay tlais aet and the commission in conformance with 
the rules promulgated pursuant to section 19-850(1) (a) (ii), Idaho Code. 

